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 The pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941 constituted one of the largest fleet-versus-fleet operations in European wa-
ters during World War II� Between May 24 and 27, 1941, the British used five 
battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, four heavy and seven light 
cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, eight submarines, and fifty aircraft to hunt the 
Bismarck combat group�1
The Bismarck combat group’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attack Brit-
ish convoys in the northern Atlantic—Unternehmen RHEINÜBUNG (Operation 
RHINE EXERCISE)—was, for the Germans, an operation; in U�S� terms, a major 
operation� Although the main German forces 
consisted of only one battleship and one heavy 
cruiser, planning for the operation was conducted 
from the operational-strategic to the tactical level 
of command�
STRATEGIC SETTING
For most of the interwar years, the Germans con-
sidered France and Poland, and possibly Soviet 
Russia, to be their most likely opponents in a fu-
ture war; they did not consider war with Britain a 
serious possibility� In April 1933, the new chancel-
lor, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, stated that Britain’s 
Royal Navy never again would be considered a 
potential adversary of the German navy� In line 
with this, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), 
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commander in chief (CINC) of the Kriegsmarine (German navy) from 1928 to 
1943, built a fleet that was not intended to challenge Britain again unilaterally, but 
instead to complement Germany’s policies on the continent�2
By 1937, however, German naval strategy had shifted toward the offensive� 
Raeder envisaged energetic employment of German naval forces to exert strate-
gic pressure on the enemy’s superior forces; a more favorable balance of forces 
was to result� This became the basis for the Kriegsmarine’s operational thinking�3 
On February 3, 1937, in his meeting with Hitler and Field Marshal Werner von 
Blomberg (1878–1946), the then minister of war and CINC of the armed forces, 
Raeder explained the Kriegsmarine’s strategy in the case of a war� He stated that 
what he called Atlantikkriegführung (Atlantic warfare) and war in distant ocean 
areas would be part of the larger war effort� The objective would be to secure con-
trol of sea communications by hitting the enemy decisively, thereby contributing 
to the overall strategic objective�4
A major change in German foreign and military policy came on May 24, 1938, 
when Hitler reversed his earlier, more benign views on Great Britain�5 He issued 
instructions to consider the country a possible enemy, in addition to France and 
Soviet Russia�6 In June 1938, Raeder directed his staff to explore the implications 
of a war with Britain�7 This staff study on German naval warfare then served as 
the basis for combat instructions issued later in 1938�8 In the summer of 1938, 
the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Directorate) (SKL) produced a memo-
randum that concluded that, in a future war with Britain, owing to Germany’s 
unfavorable geographic position and the likelihood of British naval superiority, 
Germany should focus only on commerce warfare on the high seas� Such a war 
would be conducted with Panzerschiffe (armored ships popularly referred to 
as “pocket” battleships), cruisers, and U-boats� The Germans harbored some 
doubts that a successful outcome was even possible�9 High naval officials also 
studied the employment of battleships, with contradictory results: all participants 
agreed that battleships were necessary, but reached no consensus regarding their 
employment�10
Admiral Raeder believed that if a major war broke out, Germany should 
concentrate all its forces against Britain� The construction of U-boats and the 
production of aircraft must receive unconditional priority� In his concept, the 
Luftwaffe would mine the approaches to British ports and destroy transporta-
tion facilities, so the Kriegsmarine could conduct trade warfare using U-boats 
and surface ships, supported by naval aircraft� Raeder also believed that trade 
warfare could not be limited to belligerents but must include attacks on neutral 
shipping�11
The Germans were aware that, as things stood, in the case of a war at sea with 
Britain their position would be inferior� But Hitler wanted Germany to have 
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a much larger navy, one that could be used as a global instrument of power� 
So early in 1938, Hitler directed that a formidable force of battleships be built� 
Raeder therefore revised the existing naval construction program� The result was 
the so-called Plan Z, which envisaged a Kriegsmarine that was numerically and 
qualitatively much larger� Hitler formally approved Plan Z in January 1939� The 
projection was that by 1946 the Kriegsmarine would have in service six new-class 
fifty-thousand-ton battleships (with diesel engines and 406 mm guns), three new-
class ten-thousand-ton pocket battleships, four twenty-thousand-ton aircraft 
carriers, five ten-thousand-ton heavy cruisers, sixteen eight-thousand-ton light 
cruisers, twenty-two five-thousand-ton scouting cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers, 
and ninety torpedo boats� Initially, Plan Z envisaged construction of around 250 
U-boats (twenty-seven of two thousand tons, sixty-two 750-ton Type IXs, one 
hundred five-hundred-ton Type VIIs, and sixty 250-ton Type IIs)�12 In the sum-
mer of 1939, the number of U-boats planned was increased to three hundred�13
On August 4, 1939, the SKL directed that in the case of a war the Kriegsmarine 
was to cut off enemy sea communications by using all available forces� Enemy 
naval forces were to be attacked only if that would contribute to the war on enemy 
commerce�14 The day before Germany’s September 1 invasion of Poland, Hitler’s 
Directive Number 1 ordered that if Britain and France declared war the Kriegs-
marine was to concentrate on commerce destruction, especially against Britain�15 
The Luftwaffe was directed to prepare to conduct air attacks against shipping 
carrying imports to Britain�16
Yet when war began with Britain and France on September 3, 1939, the con-
struction for which Plan Z called barely had started, and the Kriegsmarine was 
unprepared to carry out a protracted war at sea, especially on the open ocean� 
Britain’s naval power was overwhelming compared with that of Germany� At that 
time the Kriegsmarine had in service six heavy surface combatants: two battle-
ships (which sometimes were referred to as battle cruisers), three pocket battle-
ships, and one heavy cruiser� These were the only units capable of conducting 
sustained operations on the open ocean� The remainder of the fleet consisted of 
six light cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, and twenty torpedo boats� Under con-
struction were four battleships, two aircraft carriers, four heavy cruisers, sixteen 
destroyers, and ten (destroyer-size) torpedo boats� Out of fifty-seven U-boats, 
only twenty-two were suitable for employment in the Atlantic�17 Raeder later 
wrote that the Kriegsmarine was, from the beginning of war, numerically inferior 
to the naval services of its enemies� The Kriegsmarine lacked aircraft carriers and 
sufficient escorts for its large surface combatants� It did not have an adequate 
number of long-range reconnaissance aircraft� Germany also lacked advanced 
naval bases overseas� In Raeder’s view, only unity in planning operations and 
decisiveness in their execution could neutralize the enemy’s advantages�18
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OPERATIONAL SITUATION
Initially, Germany conducted its war on Britain’s maritime commerce almost en-
tirely with U-boats� June 1940 brought great improvement to the U-boat situation 
owing to new bases obtained in Norway and France� Use of the French bases re-
duced the U-boats’ transit distance to their operating areas by some 450 nautical 
miles� At the same time, British antisubmarine (A/S) defenses were weak� But the 
Germans could not exploit these advantages, because the number of U-boats at 
sea was small� Between June 1, 1940, and March 1, 1941, seventy-two U-boats en-
tered into service, while only thirteen were lost� Yet between November 1940 and 
February 1941 only some twenty-four boats were operational, and only about ten 
were in the operating area at any time�19 At the end of February 1941 the number 
of frontline U-boats was only twenty-two; many of the remaining U-boats were 
undergoing training�20 However, despite their numerical weakness, the U-boats 
were highly successful in destroying enemy shipping� From June 1940 to March 
1941, U-boats sank 381 ships of over two million Bruttoregistertonnen (gross 
registered tons) (BRT)�21
In March 1940, the Germans started to employ auxiliary cruisers in distant 
ocean areas�22 By the end of March 1941, the seven auxiliary cruisers then in 
service had sunk or captured some eighty ships, of 494,291 BRT� Yet in contrast 
to the U-boats, the tonnage of enemy ships the auxiliary cruisers destroyed was 
of secondary importance; their principal purpose was to tie down enemy forces 
in distant areas, thereby relieving enemy pressure in home waters�23
Admiral Raeder’s views on employing heavy surface ships were influenced 
greatly by his personal experiences during World War I� The leaders of the former 
Imperial German Navy had been criticized heavily for their failure to employ the 
battle line actively during the war, and Raeder was determined that under no 
circumstance would an analogous situation develop in the employment of heavy 
surface ships during any new war� The German principal objective in employing 
heavy surface ships against enemy maritime traffic was to destroy enemy mer-
chant ships� This required that German heavy surface ships remain undamaged 
for as long as possible� Hence, they had to avoid encounters with equally strong 
or superior enemy forces�24
The Kriegsmarine was unable to begin using its heavy surface ships against 
British shipping during the spring and summer of 1940 because it was focusing 
all its attention on supporting the campaign in Norway and preparing to carry 
out Plan SEELÖWE (SEA LION), the invasion of England� In September 1940, 
the Germans attempted for the first time to employ one of their heavy surface 
ships, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, to attack British traffic in the Atlantic� 
However, that attempt failed when the ship developed engine problems�25 Engine 
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malfunctions also delayed the next attempt, a sortie by the pocket battleship 
Admiral Scheer� Finally, on October 29, 1940, Admiral Scheer left Gotenhafen 
(Gdynia today) in the Baltic Sea for the Atlantic� It operated in the Caribbean 
Sea and the Indian Ocean�26 When it returned to Kiel on April 1 after around 160 
days, it had cruised 46,000 nautical miles and sunk seventeen ships of 113,233 
BRT�27 Admiral Scheer also forced the enemy to assign large forces to protect his 
convoys� In the meantime, Admiral Hipper made a foray into the Atlantic from 
November 30 to December 27, 1940� It returned to Brest, France, because of re-
peated engine problems�28 In its second foray, Admiral Hipper left Brest on Febru-
ary 1 and returned to Kiel on March 28� During this cruise it sank seven ships of 
32,896 BRT and heavily damaged two other ships of 9,899 BRT�29
While Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper were at sea on January 22, 1941, the 
SKL sent battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau out into the Atlantic to attack 
enemy shipping (Operation BERLIN)� Their two-month cruise was highly suc-
cessful� Some twenty-two ships of 115,622 BRT were either sunk or captured�30 
This number included sixteen enemy ships, of eighty thousand BRT, that had 
been sailing independently� Both battleships returned to Brest on March 22�31
From July 1940 to March 1941, German heavy surface ships sank or captured 
forty-seven ships of over 250,000 BRT�32 During that same period, Luftwaffe 
bombers sank almost the same tonnage�33 Yet this put the performance of both 
categories far behind that of the auxiliary cruisers� However, by the spring of 
1941 Germany had battleships, heavy cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers operating 
in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans�34 Admiral Raeder believed that good 
opportunities existed in 1941 to destroy enemy shipping in the Atlantic by using 
surface ships in coordination with U-boats�35 And indeed, British shipping losses 
from enemy action rose steadily as 1941 unfolded: during February some 403,600 
tons of shipping were lost, 529,000 during March, and 687,000 during April� Most 
of these losses occurred in the Atlantic�36
To Admiral Raeder and the SKL, the results from employing heavy surface 
ships during the fall of 1940 and the winter and spring of 1941 confirmed that 
their concept was valid� They had high hopes for even greater future successes 
after the entry into service within a few months of Bismarck and Tirpitz, the 
strongest battleships in the world� At the same time, Raeder and the SKL had 
no illusions; a day would come when operations with heavy surface ships in the 
Atlantic would become prohibitively risky� For instance, they considered it only 
a matter of time before the United States entered the war�37 Hence, their intent 
was to intensify the employment of their heavy surface forces while it was still 
possible to do so�38
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Operating Area
The area in which the opposing forces operated encompassed rather a large part 
of the eastern North Atlantic� Prior to combat, the Bismarck group moved from 
Gotenhafen across the southeastern part of the Baltic, through the Danish straits, 
and along the Norwegian coast up to Trondheim� Almost all the combat actions 
took place in the area between latitudes 45 and 67 degrees N and between lon-
gitudes 10 and 40 degrees W� This area is bounded by Iceland and Greenland to 
the north, Ireland and Scotland to the east, and the Faeroe and Shetland Islands 
to the northeast�
The climate in the northeastern Atlantic, the British Isles, and Iceland is in-
fluenced greatly by the remnants of the Gulf Stream, the Icelandic Low in winter 
months, and the North Atlantic Subtropical High� These factors result in mild, 
rainy winters and relatively dry summers�39 The North Atlantic is well known for 
its bad weather; fair weather is rare�40 In general, clouds cover the area up to 70 
percent of the year, mostly with low-altitude formations�41
In the eastern Atlantic, winds generally blow from the west� While they de-
crease in the summer, winds higher than force 4 prevail at least 65 percent of the 
year�42
In the northeastern Atlantic, storms are fairly frequent, especially north of 
the British Isles� The most dangerous are large storms that stall over the central 
North Atlantic� They sweep the area with strong southwesterly winds, creat-
ing heavy seas for long periods� These extratropical cyclones (large-scale low- 
pressure weather systems that occur in midlatitudes) are most prevalent during 
the winter months� Off the west coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, winds 
are strongest from October through March, with December and January the 
roughest months�43
In the northern part of the North Atlantic, field ice appears in January and 
lasts until April�44 Harbor ice may occur from December to May; during the pe-
riod in question, it generally prevented the use of ports in Greenland, Labrador, 
Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia�45 Pack ice and icebergs are carried down the 
east coast of Greenland through the Denmark Strait� Between mid-August and 
November or December there is little ice in the Denmark Strait; navigation is 
more restricted during the rest of the year, especially from March to June, when 
ice covers most of the strait� However, ice seldom is found within the hundred-
fathom line, owing to a warm, northward-flowing current�46
The North Atlantic itself is too deep for laying mines; however, mines could 
be laid in the Denmark Strait, off the coasts of Iceland and Britain, and in the 
Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages�47 Iceland’s entire coast is fronted by an 
extensive 110-fathom shelf that extends forty to sixty miles offshore� In January 
1941, the British laid some two thousand mines between Iceland and the Faeroe 
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Islands, more mines in February, and 6,100 more in March� On April 26, mines 
were laid off the northwest tip of Iceland, with the minefield extending some fifty 
miles in a northwesterly direction�48 Reportedly, the Germans were aware of this 
minefield�49
The duration of the day in the operating area greatly affected the employment 
of guns, torpedoes, and aircraft� Among other things, long, bright nights in the 
summer made it difficult to conceal the movement of ships� For example, on 
May 24, 1941, sunrise at latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 27 degrees W was 
at 0710, sunset at 0419� Thus, the duration of daylight was twenty-one hours, 
nine minutes� On the same day, sunrise at latitude 48 degrees N and longitude 42 
degrees W occurred at 0258, sunset at 1830; the duration of the day was fifteen 
hours, thirty-two minutes� Conversely, long nights encompass a large part of the 
area from late fall to early spring� This heavily constrained the effectiveness of 
air reconnaissance� Long nights also limited the duration of aircraft contacts and 
the employment of torpedo aircraft and bombers from carriers and land bases� 
This greatly increased the likelihood of U-boats attacking successfully� At higher 
latitudes, long daylight during the summer months made it easy to observe and 
destroy supply ships� For the Germans, the most favorable time for breaking out 
into the northern Atlantic was from November through February; the most un-
favorable, from May through September�50
The area of operations for the German naval forces and the Luftwaffe stretched 
from the Polish and German coasts in the Baltic Sea to Denmark and Norway’s 
occupied southwestern and western coasts� The most important bases were at 
Gotenhafen and Danzig (Gdańsk today) and the Bergen area and Trondheim 
in Norway� The British Royal Navy used a relatively large number of naval/air 
bases in northern Scotland and the Orkneys� On Scotland’s eastern coast, the 
most important naval bases were at Cromarty, Invergordon, and Inverness� The 
Firth of Clyde (near Glasgow), Loch Ewe, Liverpool (in northwest England), and 
Pembroke (in southwest Wales) were the largest bases on Britain’s western coast�51
Scapa Flow was the main base for the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet� It is the best 
anchorage in the Orkneys, offering ships an almost landlocked shelter� Depths 
range up to 118 feet, while tidal currents within the harbor are almost negligi-
ble�52 The distance from Scapa Flow to Trondheim is 795 miles�
The British ships and aircraft based in northern Scotland operated from a cen-
tral position in relation to any hostile force trying to break out through the Den-
mark Strait and the Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages� Hence, they benefited 
from divergent and relatively short lines of operation� The distance between the 
Pentland Firth (a strait separating the Orkneys from Caithness, in northern Scot-
land) and Reykjavík is about 790 miles� Similarly, the British forces that patrolled 
the Denmark Strait or were based in Iceland were located in a central position 
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and hence also had short and diverging lines of operation� In contrast, the Ger-
man surface ships approaching the British blocking positions had to traverse long 
and converging lines of operation�
Operational Command and Control
One of the most critical elements in the planning and successful execution of any 
military action is command and control (C2)� Sound command organization or 
structure is one of the prerequisites for successful C2� Optimally, command orga-
nization should be centralized but at the same time allow for sufficient freedom 
of action by subordinate commanders� This combination can be accomplished 
by having intermediate levels of command and by applying faithfully, at all lev-
els of command, the German-style mission command� Command organization 
should delineate clearly the authority and responsibilities among commanders 
at all levels�
Germany’s Kriegsmarine was a highly centralized organization� Raeder argued 
(correctly) that high headquarters has all the information, the necessary com-
munications facilities, knowledge of enemy radio traffic, and full control of the 
supply organization�53
Raeder was CINC of the navy, head of the Oberkommando der Marine (Na-
val High Command), and chief of the SKL� The SKL was responsible for plan-
ning and conducting naval warfare beyond home waters� It consisted of several 
departments, with the 1st, or Operations, Department (1�/SKL) being the most 
important�54
The Flottenkommandant (fleet commander) was a four-star admiral� As in the 
Imperial German Navy, the fleet commander was the highest operational com-
mander for surface forces� He was embarked aboard a flagship�55 Subordinate to 
the fleet commander were various type-force commanders� The fleet command-
er’s position was weakened greatly when Marinegruppekommandos (naval group 
commands) were established, the first being Naval Group Command East, estab-
lished in Kiel, Germany, in November 1938� It was disbanded in August 1940 and 
merged into Naval Group Command North on August 8, with headquarters in 
Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden�56 Naval Group Command North was responsible 
for all Kriegsmarine activity in the Baltic Sea, the German Bight, Denmark, and 
Norway�57 Naval Group Command West was established at Wilhelmshaven- 
Sengwarden in August 1939� Initially it was responsible for operations in the Ger-
man Bight, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean� Its headquarters was moved to Paris 
in August 1940� The responsibilities of Naval Group Command West for opera-
tions in the German Bight and the North Sea were transferred to Naval Group 
Command North� Naval Group Command West retained operational control in 
the Atlantic and became responsible for operations in the English Channel, Bay 
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of Biscay, and Southwest Approaches (to the British Isles)�58 The establishment 
of naval group commands transferred ashore the operational control of seagoing 
forces, in essence reducing the fleet commander to a tactical commander in com-
bat�59 During the Bismarck operation, the commander of Naval Group Command 
North was Admiral Rolf Carls (1885–1945), while Naval Group Command West 
was commanded by Admiral Alfred Saalwächter (1883–1945)�60
The German U-boat arm was established officially on September 27, 1935� 
After January 1936, U-boats were led by the Führer der Unterseeboote (leader of 
U-boats), with a rank of navy captain; on October 17, 1939, the position was el-
evated to Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (commander of U-boats) (B�d�U�), with 
a rank of rear admiral�61 At the time of the Bismarck foray, the B�d�U� was Admiral 
Karl Dönitz (1891–1980)� He was directly subordinate to the SKL�
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord of the 
Admiralty Albert V� Alexander (1885–1965)� (His position was the equivalent of 
today’s Secretary of the Navy in the United States�) The Admiralty itself consisted 
of five sea lords plus four other high officials� The First Sea Lord and Chief of 
Naval Staff was Admiral Dudley Pound (1877–1943)� He was the highest naval 
official responsible for naval operations� In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Ad-
miralty’s responsibilities included operational planning and execution� The most 
important Admiralty divisions were Plans, Operations, Trade, and Intelligence� 
The work of the Plans and Operations Divisions was coordinated closely with the 
Intelligence Division�62
The Naval Staff was created in 1917� The Plans Division was responsible for 
making strategic and operational decisions� The Operations Division controlled 
deployed naval forces in home waters and overseas� It was also responsible for 
worldwide naval dispositions and day-to-day, even hour-to-hour, movements� 
Naval area commands and overseas commands enjoyed almost total indepen-
dence� Yet the Admiralty remained a focal point for the direction of fleet opera-
tions� The principal maritime theater for the British was the northern Atlantic�63
The Home Fleet, created in 1902, represented the largest operational level of 
command in the Royal Navy� Its operating area was the waters around the Brit-
ish Isles� The Home Fleet was organized into a number of type-force commands, 
with a flag officer leading each one� In September 1939, the main components of 
the Home Fleet were the 2nd Battle Squadron; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 
(BCS 1); the 18th Cruiser Squadron (CS 18); Rear Admiral, Submarines (2nd 
Submarine Flotilla, 6th Submarine Flotilla); Vice Admiral, Carriers; 6th and 
8th Destroyer Flotillas; and the Orkneys/Shetlands force� Another element that 
played a significant role in the operation in question was Force H, established 
in June 1940� It was based at Gibraltar and operated mainly in the western 
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Mediterranean� It consisted of one carrier (Ark Royal), one battle cruiser (Re-
nown), one light cruiser, and six destroyers�64
Another major element was Western Approaches Command, which was led 
by a CINC, a four-star admiral� It was established in Liverpool, England, on 
September 9, 1939� The Combined Operations Headquarters was moved from 
Plymouth, England, to Liverpool on February 17, 1941� The main responsibility 
of Western Approaches Command was the defense and protection of the trans-
atlantic convoys and coastal shipping in the Western Approaches�
The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command was established in 1936� It 
became the RAF’s only maritime arm after the Fleet Air Arm was transferred to 
the Royal Navy in 1937� The main responsibility of the Coastal Command was to 
defend the British (and later Allied) convoys from U-boat and Luftwaffe attacks� 
In 1941, the principal subordinate commands of the Coastal Command deployed 
on the British Isles were Number 15 Group, with headquarters in Liverpool; 
Number 16 Group, at Chatham, in Kent, southeast England; and Number 18 
Group, at Pitreavie Castle, near Rosyth, Scotland�65
The Opposing Commanders
The two highest commanders of the opposing seagoing forces in the operation 
were the German fleet commander, Admiral Günther Lütjens (1889–1941), and 
the British CINC of the Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey (1885–1971)�
Lütjens was considered to be one of the ablest German admirals: highly intel-
ligent, deliberate, and levelheaded in his assessment of situations and people�66 He 
was dedicated, single-minded, stoical, and austere� There was no doubt that he 
was a man of great personal courage and integrity�67 He was not a Nazi believer�68
Lütjens entered the Imperial Navy in April 1907 and graduated from its naval 
academy� During World War I, he spent most of his time in torpedo boats, took 
part in a series of raids against Dunkirk, and by 1917–18 was a torpedo flotilla 
leader� During the 1920s, Lütjens commanded a battleship and a torpedo boat 
flotilla�69 He was promoted to captain in July 1933 and served in the Naval Per-
sonnel Office� Through the rest of the 1930s, Lütjens commanded a light training 
cruiser, served as chief of the Naval Personnel Office, and was Commander of 
Torpedo Boats (which included destroyers)�70 He was promoted to rear admiral 
in October 1937 and vice admiral in January 1940� He was Commander, Scout-
ing Forces and deputy to the fleet commander, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall 
(1886–1976)� In March 1940, Lütjens commanded the battleships Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau during the invasion of Norway in April–June 1940.71 He also was 
briefly acting fleet commander during the campaign in Norway, when Marschall 
fell sick�72 In July 1940, Lütjens became fleet commander� On September 1, 1940, 
he was promoted to four-star admiral�73 Lütjens led a highly successful foray with 
two battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) in January–March 1941 (Operation 
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BERLIN)� Admiral Raeder had high confidence and trust in Lütjens, greatly valu-
ing his broad and diverse professional experience�74
Admiral John Tovey entered the Royal Navy at the age of fifteen� He was com-
manding officer of the destroyer Onslow in the battle of Jutland in 1916, during 
which Onslow “single-handedly” attacked the German cruiser Wiesbaden; Tovey 
successfully brought his badly damaged ship back to port�75 He spent most of 
his subsequent career in destroyers� Tovey served as Rear Admiral, Destroyers, 
Mediterranean Fleet in 1938, and then as Vice Admiral, Light Forces in 1940� He 
was considered a natural leader�76 He was aggressive and acted with a great deal 
of initiative� Admiral Andrew Cunningham (1883–1963), CINC of the Mediter-
ranean Fleet—known as a strict disciplinarian—had a high opinion of Tovey’s 
professional abilities; however, Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, had 
a more ambiguous, if not a negative, view� Pound considered Tovey “difficult at 
times and not overburdened with brains�”77 Tovey did what he thought was right; 
he refused to kowtow to superiors; and he hated yes-men�78 Tovey had an awk-
ward initial interview with Prime Minister Winston S� Churchill (1874–1965) 
that almost cost him the job, but in the end he became CINC of the Home Fleet 
largely because of the support of First Lord Alexander and Admiral Pound�79 
Later Churchill found Tovey stubborn and wanted to get rid of him�80
Tovey took command of the Home Fleet on December 20, 1940� His appoint-
ment broke with tradition because he was a junior vice admiral; normally, the 
CINC of the Home Fleet was a senior four-star admiral or admiral of the fleet�81 
Tovey immediately began intensive training in night fighting, both in conducting 
air attacks and in defending against enemy air attacks�82
Vice Admiral Sir James F� Somerville (1882–1949) was in command of Force 
H� His naval career as a commissioned officer began with service in the armored 
cruiser Sutlej� He became a specialist in wireless telegraphy� During World War 
I, Somerville served in the battleship Marlborough, battleship Queen Elizabeth, 
battle cruiser Inflexible, and cruiser Chatham. He was promoted to captain in 
1921� Throughout the 1920s, he served as Deputy Director of Signals at the Ad-
miralty, next commanded the 4th Battle Squadron and the battleship Benbow, 
and then returned as Director of Signals� In 1931, Somerville commanded the 
cruiser Norfolk in the Home Fleet� Somerville was promoted to commodore in 
1932 and a year later to rear admiral� He served as Flag Officer, Destroyers in 
1936� After being promoted to vice admiral in September 1937, he became CINC, 
East Indies in July 1938� Because of illness Somerville retired in early 1939, but 
was recalled to active duty late in the year� He was deputy to Admiral Bertram 
Ramsay (1883–1945) during the Dunkirk evacuation� Somerville was appointed 
commander of the newly established Force H on June 22, 1940�
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Operational Intelligence
In 1941, British signal intelligence (SIGINT) was not yet fully developed, and 
the penetration of German codes was still in its infancy; in 1940, priority had 
been given to cracking the Luftwaffe’s codes because they were readily accessible� 
Also, the Battle of Britain, not war in the North Atlantic, was the most immediate 
threat� The Kriegsmarine was very careful in coding its radio messages, and used 
a very sophisticated, almost impenetrable version of the Enigma machine� The 
British did not achieve even isolated breakthroughs in Kriegsmarine radio traffic 
until 1940, and the most important breakthrough was achieved in June 1941— 
after the sinking of Bismarck� Until then, British SIGINT contributed only direc-
tion finding (DF) of German naval radio transmissions and some traffic analysis�83
This SIGINT was supplemented with air reconnaissance of German naval 
bases and shipyards� The Royal Navy did not have land-based reconnaissance 
aircraft to reconnoiter German naval bases in the Baltic such as Gotenhafen, so 
it depended on the RAF to perform that function� However, the RAF generally 
was reluctant to divert any resources from its strategic bombing efforts; it did not 
want to risk its aircraft on naval targets� Therefore photoreconnaissance contrib-
uted little to the operational intelligence available�84
The British Special Intelligence Service (SIS) had an extensive network 
of agents, mostly resistance fighters and Western sympathizers in German- 
occupied countries� SIS agent reports provided critically valuable information on 
enemy naval movements�85 The British apparently had many agents in Norway 
who reported on German military activities� They used shortwave transmitters 
to communicate with their contacts in London�86
The Germans’ principal sources of information on British forces and their 
movements were the Kriegsmarine’s naval intelligence radio-intercept service, 
known as B-Dienst, and the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance aircraft� B-Dienst teams 
also were deployed aboard major surface combatants, including those of the 
Bismarck group� By September 3, 1939, B-Dienst had broken the major British 
merchant and naval operational codes, and thus was able to track British naval 
movements� However, changes to the British codes in August 1940 reduced B-
Dienst’s effectiveness in this area� Still, by October 1940 B-Dienst could read 
some 30 percent of British signals, and by January 1941 it again had mastered the 
British code system�87
Photo and visual air reconnaissance was the responsibility of the Luftwaffe; 
however, it generally was not very receptive to Kriegsmarine requirements� Its 
aircraft lacked the endurance to conduct long-range missions—few Luftwaffe 
aircraft could fly over British bases� Luftwaffe personnel also lacked the training 
necessary to conduct visual recognition of naval targets�88
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THE GERMAN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The SKL and Naval Group Commands North and West prepared a number 
of studies on the employment of heavy forces in the conduct of Atlantikkrieg-
führung� These studies served as the basis on which the SKL and naval group 
commands drafted operative Weisungen (operational instructions); a fleet com-
mander issued Operationbefehle (operations orders)�
On April 2, 1941, Admiral Raeder issued operational instructions to the fleet 
commander, the commanders of Naval Group Commands North and West, and 
the Commander of U-boats on the conduct of war in the Atlantic� He pointed 
out how tactical successes in the North Atlantic could have strategic effects on 
the war in the Mediterranean and the southern Atlantic� The most decisive effect 
on the war in the Atlantic would come from cutting off traffic between North 
America and Britain across the North Atlantic�
Raeder recognized that the numerically inferior German forces could not 
achieve sea dominance over the North Atlantic readily; however, he hoped the 
Germans could obtain local and limited control, and thereby gain sea dominance 
gradually� Raeder believed the enemy would be forced to strengthen significantly 
the defenses of his convoys, at the price of weakening his position in home wa-
ters and the Mediterranean or reducing the frequency of convoys�89 Employing 
Germany’s heavy ships over a wide ocean area would force the enemy to fragment 
his naval strength� This, in turn, would allow the Germans to mass forces against 
enemy weak points�90
However, Raeder’s concept was deeply flawed� Even if the Germans were able 
gradually to obtain sea control in the North Atlantic, they could not maintain it 
for very long�
German Plans
In his operational instruction issued on April 2, Raeder envisaged the employ-
ment of four battleships against enemy shipping in the Atlantic: Bismarck and 
Tirpitz from Gotenhafen and Gneisenau and Scharnhorst from Brest�91 They 
would join up in the North Atlantic and operate against convoys� The assump-
tion was that the British would be forced to suspend convoys, and even might be 
forced to withdraw their battleships from the Mediterranean�92 These hopes were 
crushed when Gneisenau was torpedoed on April 6 and Scharnhorst experienced 
such serious machinery problems that it would not be available until the end 
of June� The British air raids on Kiel led to further delays in repairs to Admiral 
Scheer and Admiral Hipper; Admiral Scheer would not be available until the 
end of July, Admiral Hipper until August� The first German aircraft carrier, the 
33,550-ton Graf Zeppelin, was eight months away from completion�93 Tirpitz was 
undergoing sea trials and would not be operational by May 1941�
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Raeder made a difficult decision: to employ Bismarck and the heavy cruiser 
Prinz Eugen alone� As a result, instead of being a part of a much larger effort, 
Bismarck’s foray became an isolated operation� This, in turn, greatly increased the 
risk, because the enemy would be able to concentrate all available forces against 
the Bismarck group�94
The SKL issued the final operational instruction for RHEINÜBUNG on April 14, 
1941� At his meeting with Hitler on April 20, Admiral Raeder pointed out that 
the first, similar operation in the North Atlantic, conducted by the battleships 
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in January–March 1941, had been a significant tacti-
cal success� Moreover, it had considerable strategic effect in the Mediterranean 
and South Atlantic�95 He also claimed that commerce warfare was proceeding 
successfully�96 Raeder informed Hitler that the next battleship operation, by 
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, would be conducted in late April� The Pan-American 
Security Zone would be respected�97 Hitler, while not rejecting the plan, had great 
misgivings about it; yet he left it to Raeder to make the final decision�98 Raeder 
emphasized to Hitler that dangerous conditions existed at Kiel and Wilhelmsha-
ven, and at Brest as well, where German ships went for repairs after their forays 
into the Atlantic� Hence, Brest shipyard would be used only in exceptional cases; 
it was important to acquire use of the Spanish port of El Ferrol� Hitler promised 
to secure that port for German ships in the fall of 1941� He also asked Raeder to 
explore whether Organisation Todt could be used to build a large dry dock at 
Trondheim quickly�99
Admiral Lütjens issued his operations order on April 22, 1941� Four days 
later, Lütjens had a meeting with Raeder to discuss the timing of the operation� 
Lütjens argued that the operation should be delayed until the damages Prinz 
Eugen had suffered when it ran into a mine were repaired�100 He also suggested 
that Bismarck might sail out alone, to be followed by Prinz Eugen, or that both 
ships delay sortieing until the next new moon�101 Lütjens further believed that 
the operation’s chances of success would be much greater if the combat group’s 
sortie was delayed until either Scharnhorst was repaired or Tirpitz became fully 
operational; the latter had been commissioned in February but, as mentioned, 
was still undergoing sea trials� He presciently told Raeder that any employment 
of Bismarck alone would trigger a massive response from the enemy, reducing the 
chances of success� Lütjens and Raeder also discussed the use of Brest after the 
completion of the operation, with Raeder stating that any stay at the French port 
should be short, only to embark munitions and supplies� If Bismarck were heavily 
damaged, it should steer to Saint-Nazaire instead; for a longer pause or overhaul, 
Bismarck should head directly for home port� Lütjens stressed the importance of 
air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait to locate the ice boundary and any en-
emy patrols� He also requested that Raeder assign a larger number of aircraft and 
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U-boats, plus fishing steamers, to support the operation� Raeder concurred, and 
gave corresponding orders to his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Otto Schniewind 
(1887–1964)�102 Raeder later praised Lütjens for being so open with him, even 
though the fleet commander did not accept Raeder’s reasoning entirely�103 Lütjens 
had a premonition that Bismarck’s foray would end badly� After meeting with 
Raeder, he stopped briefly in the office of the future rear admiral Hans Voss and 
reportedly said, “I’d like to make my farewells� I’ll never come back�” He added, 
“Given the superiority of the British, survival is improbable�”104
Raeder’s operational instruction of April 14 stated that the aufgabe (task) of 
the fleet commander was to attack the enemy supply traffic in the Atlantic north 
of the equator�105 The situation would determine the duration of the operation�106 
The primary aim was to destroy the largest volume of enemy shipping, particu-
larly that destined for British ports�107
The operations order that Lütjens issued on April 22 stipulated that the group’s 
tasks were to sail through the Belts (the Danish straits) and the Arctic Ocean into 
the Atlantic, then attack shipping traffic in the northern Atlantic� Afterward, the 
group was to sail to a French port to replenish ammunition and supplies� If longer 
repairs or an overhaul were needed, the ships were to return to home port in Ger-
many�108 Originally, the operation was planned to start on April 28, to coincide 
with the new moon; however, it was delayed until May 18 because of the mine 
damages to Prinz Eugen and to conduct crane repairs on Bismarck.109
The forces initially assigned to support the operation consisted of several Luft-
waffe squadrons and several U-boats, plus a number of logistical support ships� 
The commander of the 5th Air Fleet, General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968), 
was informed about RHEINÜBUNG, and that all available aircraft in Denmark 
and Norway were to provide continuous fighter cover and a close A/S defense 
screen, as well as reconnaissance of the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean to the 
limits of the various aircrafts’ effective ranges� They also were to reconnoiter the 
British naval base at Scapa Flow� Air Leader Stavanger assigned the responsibil-
ity for reconnaissance to 1st Squadron, 120th Aufklärungsgruppe (Reconnais-
sance Group) (designated 1� / F 120), reinforced by one squadron of the 121st 
Reconnaissance Group (F 121), which flew Junkers (Ju) 88s� Also deployed in 
support of the Bismarck group were naval flying boat squadrons and Heinkel 
(He) 115 squadrons; these were based in Norway, concentrated in the Skagerrak– 
Trondheim area� Two reconnaissance squadrons of Ju-88s and 1� / F 120 moni-
tored Scapa Flow continuously� They also provided continuous coverage of the 
North Sea and the Arctic� Parts of the 30th Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing) (KG 
30), flying Ju-88s, and the 26th Battle Wing (KG 26), flying He-111s and based in 
Denmark and Kristiansand and Gardermoen, Norway, were put in combat readi-
ness� Fighter protection was provided by Fighter Leader Norway�110
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GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (PLANNED), APRIL 22, 1941
 (F = flagship)
MAIN FORCES
Fleet commander: Admiral Günther Lütjens
1 battleship: Bismarck (F)
1 heavy cruiser: Prinz Eugen
SUPPORTING FORCES
6 U-boats (2 operating on north–south route, 4 operating on HX route [Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia–U.K. ports])
2 reconnaissance ships (Gonzenheim, Kota Penang)
2 supply ships (Ermland, Spichern)
4 requisitioned tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, Esso-Hamburg, Friedrich Breme)
4 weather-observation fishing steamers (Freese, München, August Wriest, 
Lauenberg)
2 mine breakers (Sperrbrecher 13, Sperrbrecher 31)
5th Minesweeper Flotilla (M-4, M-23, M-31, M-201, M-202, M-205, M-251, 
M-252, M-253)
6th Destroyer Flotilla (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16])
5TH AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER STAVANGER
2 reconnaissance squadrons (1. / F 120 [Ju-88s] Stavanger, 1. / F 121 [Ju-88As])
2 battle wings (KG 30 [Ju-88As] Eindhoven, KG 26 [He-111Hs] Stavanger-Sola)
3RD AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER ATLANTIC
5 battle wings (II. / KG 1 [Ju-88As] Rosières-en-Santerre, I. / KG 28 [He-111s] 
Nantes, KG 40 [FW-200s/Ju-88As] Bordeaux-Mérignac, II. / KG 54 
[Ju-88As] Bretigny, I. / KG 77 [Ju-88As] Juvincourt)
1 combat group (KG 100 [He-111Hs], Vannes-Meucon)
2 coastal air groups (KG 406 [He-115s] Hourtin/Brest, KG 506 [Ju-88As]  
Westerland)
Sources: Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit “Bismarck” 
und “Prinz Eugen” (Deckbezeihnung: “Rheinübung”), April 22, 1941, pp. 40–41; Jürgen 
Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945, 2nd ed. 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 63–64.
But air support of the Bismarck group during its movement from Bergen to the 
Denmark Strait turned out to be very inadequate� The Luftwaffe lacked sufficient 
numbers of reconnaissance aircraft to provide comprehensive coverage in an area 
as distant as the Denmark Strait or the Iceland–Faeroes passage� In contrast, the 
Luftwaffe provided gap-free reconnaissance of the central and northern parts 
of the North Sea� It also envisaged full air cover for the Bismarck group during 
its operational deployment from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord (an inlet in the 
Korsfjord, near Bergen)�111 The North Atlantic west of longitude 30 degrees W 
was free of German aircraft, except for sporadic reconnaissance aircraft; however, 
Luftwaffe aircraft covered the entire sea area east of longitude 30 degrees W�112 
Generally, on a daily basis one or more Focke-Wulf (FW) 200s from Bordeaux or 
Stavanger conducted reconnaissance of the sea area northwest of Ireland out to 
approximately longitude 20 degrees W�113 Coastal reconnaissance was conducted 
from bases at Brest and Hourtin, France (some thirty-two miles northwest of 
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Bordeaux), out to longitude 11 degrees W, or variously out to two hundred nauti-
cal miles, with He-111s; extension out to longitude 20 degrees W using He-111s 
and Blohm & Voss 138s was in preparation� Additionally, two reconnaissance 
ships (Gonzenheim and Kota Penang), plus some U-boats, were deployed some 
three hundred nautical miles south of Cape Farewell, Greenland, the southern 
entrance to the Denmark Strait�114
Initially, four U-boats were assigned to cooperate with the Bismarck group�115 
One was assigned to conduct weather observation in the area between latitudes 
55 and 60 degrees N and between longitudes 20 and 25 degrees W�116 Admiral 
Lütjens’s April 22 operations order stated that activity in the operating area 
would include some U-boats operating on the north–south convoy route and 
four others on the HX convoy route (which ran from Halifax, Nova Scotia, 
Canada, to U�K� ports) after the end of May, plus two reconnaissance ships and 
five tankers�117
Available to Naval Group Command West were one supply ship; three requisi-
tioned tankers carrying fuel, munitions, and food; and three tankers in reserve�118 
Assigned for logistical support of RHEINÜBUNG were two supply ships (Ermland 
and Spichern) and four (originally five) tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, Esso-
Hamburg, and Friedrich Breme).119 The support ships were deployed in waiting 
positions in the North Atlantic: one supply ship (Ermland) between the Azores 
and the Lesser Antilles, and the other (Spichern) four hundred nautical miles west 
of Faial, Azores; and the tankers Belchen and Lothringen some 120 and 200 nauti-
cal miles, respectively, south of Cape Farewell� One tanker (Esso-Hamburg) was 
deployed some 450 nautical miles (nm) northwest, and another (Breme) about 
seven hundred nautical miles southwest of Faial�120
Naval Group Command North would exercise control over the Bismarck 
group until it crossed a line running from the southern tip of Greenland to the 
northern tip of the Hebrides, when control would pass to Naval Group Com-
mand West�121 Thereafter Naval Group Command West would control the entire 
operation, with tactical control residing in the hands of Admiral Lütjens aboard 
Bismarck�122
Admiral Lütjens was responsible for the movement of reconnaissance ships, 
supply ships, and tankers during their presence in the operating area� If breakout 
into the Atlantic was detected too early, the operation was to be shortened or 
aborted, depending on the situation� In such a case, either Naval Group Com-
mand West or the fleet commander would issue the order� If a sudden change in 
the situation required withdrawal to the Arctic, Naval Group Command North 
would make preparations for the arrival of the Bismarck group�123
Several U-boats (two at a minimum) would be deployed off Freetown, Sierra 
Leone� Beginning in mid-June, up to four U-boats would be employed along 
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the eastern part of the HX route between longitudes 30 and 45 degrees W� Both 
groups would be subordinate to B�d�U�, but if an opportunity arose for direct 
cooperation, the fleet commander had authority to give orders directly to the 
U-boats�124
RHEINÜBUNG was to consist of five distinct phases: (1) movement from Go-
tenhafen to Grimstadfjord; (2) movement from Grimstadfjord to the Denmark 
Strait; (3) breakout into the North Atlantic; (4) attack on enemy shipping; and 
(5) return to home base� The SKL instruction issued on April 14 directed the 
Bismarck group to sortie from Gotenhafen in the afternoon of April 28� It would 
advance through the Belts/Skagerrak, then to the Arctic�125 During the transit of 
the Belts, defense against mines would be provided by Sperrbrecher (mine break-
ers) and the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla�126 During the group’s transit through the 
Skagerrak, several destroyers would provide A/S protection�127
Lütjens’s operations order provided a very precise timeline for transiting the 
Skagerrak and the Kattegat� This was necessary to coordinate properly the mine 
countermeasures, A/S support, and Luftwaffe air cover� During the transit of 
Arkona and the Skagen barrier, in addition to mine breakers / minesweepers, 
four destroyers (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], and Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16]) 
would provide the A/S screen for the Bismarck group�128 By 1900 on April 30, the 
Bismarck group was to reach Kristiansand; at 0230 on May 1 it would reach the 
latitude of Stavanger; at 0630 the same day, that of Korsfjord/Bergen; and on May 
2, that of Trondheim�129
In operational terms, the planned movement of the Bismarck group from 
Grimstadfjord to the Denmark Strait was an operational maneuver, followed by 
a tactical penetration into the North Atlantic� The breakout was considered the 
most difficult part of the entire operation� The aim was to enter the Atlantic un-
observed by enemy patrols, but if the Bismarck group were sighted the mission 
still was to be carried out to some extent, in accordance with the operational 
instructions�130
The German leadership incorrectly assumed that enemy patrol forces in the 
Denmark Strait would consist of auxiliary cruisers�131 However, it assumed cor-
rectly that enemy aircraft also would patrol the Denmark Strait� The Germans 
knew that a bright night would make unobserved breakout more difficult, 
whereas low visibility would facilitate breakout� They also assumed that the Luft-
waffe’s reconnaissance of the northern part of the North Sea would be sufficient 
to provide an overview of the enemy situation�132
The ice boundary also influenced planning� Naval Group Command North 
suggested to Lütjens that he execute the breakout between Iceland and the 
Faeroes because those waters were ice-free� In contrast, the Denmark Strait is 
narrow to begin with, and the width of the passage available varies with the 
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position of the ice boundary, which had the potential to make it easier for enemy 
ships to obtain and maintain contact with the Bismarck group� The enemy also 
could draw on more-southward-deployed units� Another advantage of transiting 
the gap was the shorter transit time, which saved fuel, whereas use of the strait 
would require refueling� Unfortunately, Lütjens was bound to follow SKL instruc-
tions, which stipulated an undetected breakout through the Denmark Strait into 
the Atlantic� Refueling would be provided by one tanker (Weissenberg), which 
would wait at latitude 70 degrees N, longitude 01 degree W�133
After the successful breakout, searching for and destroying the largest volume 
of enemy shipping would be the Bismarck group’s primary mission� In his opera-
tional instructions, Raeder directed that combat with an equally strong enemy 
should be avoided�134 The only exception was if such an engagement would con-
tribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective and the risk was low�135
The Gneisenau/Scharnhorst foray in January–March 1941 had shown that, 
even when B-Dienst provided the departure date and route of an enemy convoy, 
detecting those convoys in the broad spaces of the ocean depended on luck; 
if it happened, it might be only by accident� In his operations order, Lütjens 
explained that enemy convoys normally were escorted by one battleship, often 
with two cruisers and two destroyers in addition� Bismarck would tie up the 
battleship, while Prinz Eugen would deal with any other ships in the convoy’s 
screen�136
Sailing to a French port would be considered only if no significant repairs were 
required; if lengthier repairs were needed, each ship would return to its home 
port�137 If needed, the general alternate port of return would be Trondheim�138
German Execution
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen possessed an unmatched power compared with their 
respective enemy counterparts� However, the Home Fleet and Force H had an 
enormous numerical superiority, plus effective support from RAF Coastal Com-
mand� (For details, see sidebars and map 1�)
The majority of supply ships and tankers sortied about a week prior to the 
Bismarck group� The first to do so was the tanker Belchen from La Pallice on May 
10; two reconnaissance ships sortied from La Pallice on May 17�139 Four tankers 
and two supply ships would operate in the area between latitudes 45 and 46 de-
grees N and longitudes 32 and 35 degrees W� In the same area were deployed four 
weather-observation fishing steamers�140 Two tankers sailed into the Arctic�141 If 
bad weather delayed the Bismarck group breakout, one tanker was in a waiting 
position in the Norwegian Sea, while another tanker was at Trondheim�142
Prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens stopped at Kiel to see his predeces-
sor, Admiral Marschall� Marschall had been removed from his post because of 
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Map 1: BISMARCK COMBAT GROUP’S FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC,  MAY 18–27, 1941



























BISMARCK COMBAT GROUP’S FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC, MAY 18–27, 1941
(OPERATION RHEINÜBUNG [RHINE EXERCISE])
differences with Raeder and Naval Group Command West commander Admiral 
Saalwächter. During the meeting, Marschall advised Lütjens not to follow in-
structions received from the SKL too literally. Marschall believed the fleet com-
mander must have a certain freedom of action in case the situation changed.143 
Lütjens responded in a tragically resigned tone: “No! Two fleet commanders 
have already been relieved of their commands due to the displeasure of the Naval 
[High] Command. I do not wish to be the third. I know what the Naval Com-
mand desires and will carry out their orders.”144
About one week prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens also visited his 
friend and former “crew member” (classmate) Rear Admiral Conrad Patzig 
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(1888–1975), the chief of the Personnel Office� Patzig asked why Lütjens had to 
go on board as the fleet commander, because the operation was minor in scale, 
yet the risk of losing his life was acute� Lütjens agreed with Patzig, but believed 
there was no alternative�145 He did not want to question Raeder’s decision� As 
mentioned, Lütjens apparently had a premonition of what would happen to him� 
He told Patzig: “I shall have to sacrifice myself sooner or later� I have renounced 
my private life and I am determined to execute the task which has been entrusted 
to me in an honorable manner�”146
On May 12, Hitler met with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Oberkom-
mando der Wehrmacht (chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht), 
and several high-ranking members of his staff visited Bismarck at Gotenhafen� 
Raeder was not present� Hitler inspected the ship and attended gunnery exercis-
es� He had a long talk with Lütjens. He asked the admiral about the Scharnhorst/
Gneisenau experience. Lütjens mentioned to Hitler the threat that enemy carrier-
borne torpedo aircraft posed to Bismarck.147
Phase I: Gotenhafen–Grimstadfjord (0000 May 18–0900 May 21). In operational 
terms, the movement of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord 
represented the operational deployment�148 At about 0600 on May 18, Admiral 
Lütjens received from naval intelligence the latest status of the enemy heavy 
ships� The Germans estimated that in home waters were deployed three battle-
ships (Prince of Wales, King George V, and Rodney), one battle cruiser (Hood), 
and only one carrier (Victorious)� One damaged carrier (Illustrious) was prob-
ably on the way to the United States� For a long time, there was no information 
on the whereabouts of another carrier (Argus). Force H was in Gibraltar� On the 
north–south convoy route were deployed one battleship (Repulse) and one carrier 
(Furious) (used for ferrying aircraft from Britain to Gibraltar and the Gulf of 
Guinea)� One battleship (Nelson) and one carrier (Eagle) had left Durban, South 
Africa, on May 10, but it was unclear whether they were organized as a group�149
During the forenoon of May 18, Admiral Lütjens issued his Absicht (intent) 
for the pending operation� He stated that if the weather situation were favorable 
for breaking out (i�e�, it was bad), his intent was not to stop at Korsfjord but to 
proceed directly to the Arctic, refuel from the waiting tanker Weissenberg, then 
break out into the northern Atlantic through the Denmark Strait at high speed� 
He hoped that if reduced visibility and fog prevailed, an encounter with the en-
emy cruisers or auxiliary cruisers in the Denmark Strait could be avoided� In the 
case of an encounter with light forces, Prinz Eugen might use its torpedoes, on 
order from Lütjens�150
At about 2130 on May 18, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed from Gotenhafen� 
They proceeded separately until they reached Arkona, where they joined up at 
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1100 on May 19�151 On the order of the Befehlshaber der Sicherung der Ostsee 
(Commander, Security Forces, Baltic), traffic in the Great Belt and Kattegat was 
stopped for the night of May 19/20 and the morning of May 20, to enhance the 
secrecy of the Bismarck group’s movement�152
During the morning of May 20, Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance ascertained 
the presence in Scapa Flow of two battleships (King George V and Rodney), one 
battle cruiser (Hood), one carrier (Victorious), six light cruisers, four destroyers, 
and two submarines� In the northern Scotland area were probably twelve cruisers 
that were nonoperational—under repair�153 No enemy forces were sighted in the 
North Sea or the Arctic� 
Around noon on May 20, the Bismarck group was in the vicinity of the Skager-
rak mine barrier, to be escorted by the minesweeper flotilla; around 1600 it was 
escorted through the mine-free area in the Kattegat� It then was mixed with 
commercial vessels waiting to pass through the mine-free area in the reverse 
direction�154 By evening, the Bismarck group was south of Kristiansand�155
At about 0620 on May 21, the 18th Air Group transmitted a message to the 
British Admiralty concerning the presence of two enemy battleships and three 
destroyers�156 B-Dienst decrypted this message almost immediately, and Naval 
Group Command North and the SKL agreed that enemy agents had observed the 
Bismarck group in the Great Belt�157
The original source of the information to the Admiralty about Bismarck’s tran-
sit was the Swedish cruiser Gotland�158 Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl 
Petersén [1883–1963], head of Sweden’s C-Bureau, a unit for secret-intelligence 
collection) passed the information to the British naval attaché in Stockholm, 
Captain Henry Denham (1897–1993)�159 In his message the naval attaché stated: 
“Kattegat today 20th May (a) This afternoon eleven German merchant ves-
sels passed Lenker North (b) at 1500 two large German warships escorted by 
three destroyers, five escort craft, and ten to twelve aircraft passing Marstrand 
[in the Bohuslän archipelago, in the northeastern Kattegat] course northwest 
2058/20�”160 Raeder knew from Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), chief of 
the Abwehr (Military Intelligence), that the signal from Stockholm was sent to 
the Admiralty on the morning of May 21; Canaris had proof positive that British 
agents had reported the Bismarck group’s movement�161
German naval intelligence learned that the report on the sighting of the Bis-
marck group had prompted intensive reconnaissance by the 18th Air Group� This 
group, with headquarters near Rosyth, cooperated with CINC, Rosyth and the 
Orkneys/Shetlands Naval Command� The B-Dienst intercepts located enemy 
aircraft in the northern part of the North Sea, off the Norwegian coast, and in the 
Faeroes area� Yet at the same time, monitoring of the radio traffic of the Home 
Fleet revealed no sign of special activity�162
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At 0900 on May 21, the Bismarck group entered Korsfjord� Bismarck anchored 
at Grimstadfjord, at the entrance to the Fjøsanger fjord� Prinz Eugen refueled at 
Kalvanes Bay from a tanker�163 Surprisingly, Bismarck did not refuel, even though it 
had burned some two thousand tons of oil since Gotenhafen�164 From enemy radio 
transmissions, it was clear to the Germans that the enemy knew about the pres-
ence of the Bismarck group, although as noted no reaction had been detected�165
Coincidentally, the RAF planned to attack the Bismarck group during the night 
of May 21/22� It also intended to conduct reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast 
from Trondheim to Kristiansand on May 22�166 However, in both instances low 
clouds prevented aircraft from finding their targets�167 In the evening on May 21, 
British air reconnaissance ascertained that the Bismarck group had left Bergen�168
On May 21, Admiral Tovey decided to strengthen cruiser patrols in the 
Denmark Strait and between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands�169 When the heavy 
cruiser Suffolk arrived at Hvalfjord, Iceland, after being relieved by Norfolk in the 
Denmark Strait, it was directed to rejoin CS 1 after refueling�170 To save fuel, Suf-
folk would join the patrol just before the earliest arrival of the enemy� The cruiser 
Arethusa, due to arrive at Reykjavík, was directed to remain at Hvalfjord at the 
disposal of Commander, CS 1�171 BCS 1 (Hood and Prince of Wales), plus a screen 
of six destroyers (Electra, Anthony, Icarus, Echo, Achates, and Antelope), sailed 
from Scapa Flow to Hvalfjord�172 Vice Admiral Lancelot E� Holland (1887–1941), 
Commander, BCS 1, was instructed to cover patrols in the Denmark Strait and the 
Iceland–Faeroes passage, operating north of latitude 62 degrees N�173 Tovey issued 
orders recalling Repulse from the Clyde (where it was waiting to escort a convoy 
to the Middle East) to Scapa Flow�174 The cruisers Birmingham and Manchester, 
then patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, were directed to refuel at Skaalefjord 
in the Faeroe Islands, then resume patrol�175 Their assigned patrolling line was be-
tween latitude 61 degrees N, longitude 10° 30ʹ W and latitude 64 degrees N, longi-
tude 15 degrees W� Five fishing trawlers were on their routine patrols west of this 
line� Arethusa was directed to join Manchester in the Iceland–Faeroes passage�176
During the evening of May 21, Admiral Max K� Horton (1883–1951), Rear 
Admiral, Submarines, directed Minerve, then on patrol southwest of Norway, to 
move to a position at latitude 61° 53ʹ N, longitude 03° 15ʹ E, while P-31 sailed out 
from Scapa Flow to a position off Stadlandet (Selje, in the northwestern part of 
Sogne Fjord)�177
Phase II: Grimstadfjord–Denmark Strait (2200 May 21–2000 May 22). The 
Bismarck group left Grimstadfjord at 2200 on May 21� Several hours afterward, 
enemy aircraft searched for Bismarck in the skerries (small, rocky, uninhabited 
islands) off Bergen� On the basis of this enemy activity, the Germans concluded 
that the movement of the Bismarck group was known, but apparently the enemy 
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was uncertain about the group’s exact location� At 0510, after the Bismarck 
group reached the latitude of Kristiansund, Lütjens released the accompany-
ing destroyers, which would proceed to Trondheim� On the basis of reports he 
received, Lütjens believed that the major part of the Home Fleet was still at 
Scapa Flow at noon on May 22� Even if the Home Fleet sailed out on May 22, it 
would have to transit some 1,200 nautical miles to reach a position near Cape 
Farewell�178 
At 1200 on May 22, Lütjens directed the Bismarck group to increase its speed 
to twenty-four knots and steer for the Denmark Strait�179 The group was then 
some two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast�180 On the evening 
of May 22, the sky was covered with clouds and the atmosphere was misty� The 
meteorologist aboard Bismarck predicted that the weather would be favorable for 
a breakout� Lütjens intended to steer for Cape Farewell�181 Possibly he was influ-
enced by information he had received while at Korsfjord in the forenoon of May 
21, from a Luftwaffe officer who told him there was no sign that the Home Fleet 
had sailed from Scapa Flow� Lütjens probably believed that he must stay ahead of 
the enemy� He was aware that the enemy knew about his sortie from Gotenhafen 
and his stay in the skerries off Bergen�182
At 1939 on May 22, RAF aircraft reported that the enemy battleship and 
cruiser, but not the merchant ships, had left Bergen� Three destroyers and one 
catapult ship were sighted at Trondheim� Most of the Norwegian coast was then 
under fog�183 
After receiving a report at 2000 that the enemy warships had departed from 
Bergen, Tovey believed there were four possibilities regarding enemy activity� 
The first was that the convoy was carrying important military stores to northern 
Norway and would sail through the Leads; for some weeks there had been reports 
of movements of German troops to Kirkenes� The second possibility was that the 
convoy was carrying a raiding party, perhaps to capture an airfield to support an 
attack on Reykjavík or Hvalfjord� Third, the enemy battleship and cruiser might 
try to break out through the Denmark Strait to reach the trade routes, as German 
ships had done in the past� However, breaking out through the passage between 
Iceland and Scotland could not be ruled out, especially because the enemy had 
stopped at Bergen� The fourth possibility was that the enemy ships already had 
covered an important German convoy as far as the Inner Leads, and now might 
be returning to the Baltic� Tovey considered the third scenario to be the most 
likely, and made his dispositions accordingly�184
At 2043 on May 22, Tovey requested air reconnaissance of all passages between 
Greenland and the Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, as well as any enemy forces 
approaching Iceland� The aim was to detect enemy ships breaking out westward� 
The Admiralty responded to Tovey’s request by directing subordinate commands 
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to conduct reconnaissance of the Iceland–Faeroes gap, the Denmark Strait, the 
Faeroes–Shetland gap, and the Norwegian coast�185 An additional air-patrol line 
about 250 miles west of the Iceland–Faeroes passage also was established by 
CINC, Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Percy Noble (1880–1955)�186 The 15th 
Air Group units on Iceland were directed to provide A/S cover for Hood and 
Prince of Wales and to keep a close watch on the Denmark Strait�187 The Admi-
ralty canceled the sailing of the carrier Victorious and battleship Repulse, which 
had been assigned to protect pending Convoy WS8B, and put these warships at 
Admiral Tovey’s disposal� Victorious was then at Scapa Flow, while Repulse was 
directed to sail from the Clyde to Scapa Flow�188
Phase III: Breakout to the Northern Atlantic (2000 May 22‒1922 May 23). On 
May 23, the Bismarck group continued on a course to transit the Denmark Strait� 
The weather was favorable for penetration: an easterly wind, overcast skies, 
moderate-to-heavy rain, and moderate-to-bad visibility (650 feet or less)�189 
Overall, the situation for a breakout was considered favorable� However, that 
same bad weather prevented Luftwaffe aircraft from reconnoitering Scapa Flow 
on May 23�190 The Germans also did not have aircraft available to reconnoiter the 
area between Iceland and the Faeroes�191 Lütjens ordered an increase in speed to 
twenty-seven knots�192 In the meantime, Tovey’s Battle Force proceeded north-
ward to latitude 60 degrees N—far enough to be in a position to deal with either 
an attack on Iceland or a breakout�193
Also on May 23, Headquarters RAF Iceland received a message from CINC, 
Western Approaches via Flag Officer in Charge, Iceland to give priority to re-
connoitering the Denmark Strait, especially the Akureyri area of Eyja Fjord, in 
north-central Iceland� A crossover patrol of the Denmark Strait from Iceland to 
the limit of the ice already had been ordered�194 But only two air sorties of the 
Iceland–Faeroes gap were carried out, because of the bad weather, and there was 
no air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait; however, Admiral Tovey did not 
become aware of this until much later�195 Tovey directed Suffolk to patrol within 
RDF range of the ice-edge boundary in the Denmark Strait�196 When conditions 
were clear inshore, Norfolk would patrol about fifteen miles abeam of Suffolk; 
when thick inshore, Norfolk would patrol to cover the inshore passage�197
Repulse and three destroyers from Western Approaches Command joined the 
Battle Force northwest of the Butt of Lewis, Outer Hebrides, during the fore-
noon of May 23�198 Tovey intended to detach two cruisers to patrol the Faeroes– 
Shetlands passage; however, in the end he decided to keep all four cruisers with 
him�199
By noon, the Bismarck group reached the ice boundary�200 At 1427, the weather 
forecast for the area north of Iceland was for southeasterly-to-easterly winds, 
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wind force 6 to 8, mostly overcast, rain, and moderate-to-poor visibility; in the 
area south of Iceland, it was for winds of force 5 to 7; cloudy to overcast; a low-
pressure system east of Iceland; and warm air moving toward the Denmark Strait 
and the area south of Iceland�201
At 1700, the weather in the vicinity of the Bismarck group was snow showers, 
with visibility of around five thousand yards�202 The Bismarck group sailed near 
the ice boundary� On its starboard side there was good visibility, while to port 
there was fog�203 After entering the Denmark Strait shortly before 1900, the Bis-
marck group moved into an area of pack ice, with some floating icebergs, a few of 
which were of enormous size� Thus, on May 23, the width of the ice-free passage 
in the Denmark Strait was only about twenty nautical miles�204 Both Bismarck and 
Prinz Eugen were zigzagging�205
German knowledge of the situation in the Denmark Strait and its approaches 
was very spotty because of the lack of sufficient FW-200 aircraft� The last report 
that Lütjens received was provided on May 19 by a single FW-200� The aircraft re-
ported the ice boundary to be seventy to eighty nautical miles away from Iceland� 
The same day, at a distance of some fifty nautical miles northwest of North Cape, 
Iceland, another FW-200 had aborted its flight after encountering dense fog�206
At 1922, Suffolk sighted Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at a distance of 12,320 
yards and steering on a southwesterly course� The Bismarck group’s position was 
then some sixty miles northwest of North Cape�207 At the same time, Prinz Eugen 
sighted what it believed to be an auxiliary cruiser at a distance of 14,200 yards� 
Bismarck fired five salvos but scored no hits� The enemy ship disappeared�208 Suf-
folk used mist as a cover and maintained contact with Bismarck�209 At the time of 
initial contact, Tovey’s Battle Force was at latitude 60° 20ʹ N, longitude 13 degrees 
W� It turned to course 280 and increased speed to twenty-seven knots� Tovey’s 
intent was to reach a position from which he could intercept the enemy east of 
the Denmark Strait and at the same time support BCS 1� As more information 
was received, it became clear that the enemy intended to break out through the 
Denmark Strait�210
At 2028, Suffolk sighted Bismarck again near the ice boundary, at a distance of 
twelve thousand yards� Four minutes later, Norfolk also made contact with Bis-
marck at a distance of 10,560 yards�211 The Admiralty received Norfolk’s message 
at 2103, before it received Suffolk’s�212 Bismarck opened fire, but Norfolk retired 
safely behind a smoke screen�213 The Bismarck group’s repeated attempts to break 
off contact failed�214 The B-Dienst personnel aboard both Bismarck and Prinz 
Eugen deciphered Suffolk’s signal (“one battleship, one cruiser, bearing 330°, dis-
tance 6 nautical miles, course 240°”) within minutes�215 However, they mistook 
Norfolk’s call sign for that of King George V�216
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Lütjens was surprised at encountering enemy cruisers in the Denmark Strait� 
However, for some reason he did not draw the proper conclusion: that the enemy 
would try to block his foray into the Atlantic� He believed the British ships were 
not equipped with advanced search radars; however, Suffolk had been fitted with 
advanced artillery radar (Type 284/285)�217 Suffolk’s radar now had an effective 
range of 26,250 yards�218 In contrast, Norfolk had the older-model artillery radar 
(Type 286M)�219 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were fitted with search radar; how-
ever, they lacked the accurate gunfire director, and hence were unable to drive off 
shadowers using “blind” fire�220
At 2200 on May 23, the B-Dienst intercepted a message sent by a British unit, 
probably a heavy cruiser, reporting that it had detected in the Denmark Strait, at 
a distance of six nautical miles, one enemy battleship and one cruiser, both sailing 
in a southwesterly direction�221 The B-Dienst also learned that CINC, Western 
Approaches had issued a radio warning to three convoys about the possibility 
of encountering enemy ships�222 These German radio intercepts revealed urgent 
messages being sent to the enemy heavy units�223
Norfolk and Suffolk shadowed the Bismarck group throughout the night of May 
23/24� The weather was characterized by rain and mist and the visibility was as low 
as two miles� The ships “shadowed by sight and/or RDF according to visibility�” 
Norfolk kept farther south and east “to cover move of enemy away from ice�”224
Phase IV: Encounter in the Denmark Strait, 0538‒0613 May 24. BCS 1 (Hood 
and Prince of Wales) and its screen arrived at their assigned position at about 
0205—sooner than Tovey had anticipated� Both ships turned to a course parallel 
to that of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen�225 At 0200, Admiral Holland detached his 
destroyers because CS 1 had lost contact with Bismarck� This was a serious error, 
though, because he lost the opportunity to launch torpedo attacks on the German 
ships�226 During the rest of the night, Prince of Wales obtained positions by using 
RDF information from Norfolk and Suffolk�227
At 0538, Suffolk again regained contact with the Bismarck group�228 At 0545, 
the Bismarck group’s B-Dienst detachment identified two enemy units: Hood 
and a battleship of the King George V class (actually Prince of Wales)� The enemy 
ships were at a distance of 31,700 yards and sailing at high speed� At 0552, Hood 
opened fire at a range of 25,000 yards� Two minutes later both German ships 
responded�229 They concentrated their fire on Hood�230 The running combat dis-
tance varied from 19,650 to 22,750 yards�231 The fire of both Bismarck and Prinz 
Eugen was excellent� Hood was hit by the second or third salvo, which started 
fires aboard that spread rapidly�232 At 0600, Hood was straddled again� There was 
a huge explosion and Hood blew up�233 It sank in three to four minutes�234 Hood 
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had been able to fire only five or six salvos�235 Out of a ship’s company of ninety-
five officers and 1,324 men, only three survived�236
After the sinking of Hood, Prince of Wales engaged Bismarck. Both Prinz Eugen 
and Bismarck shifted their fire onto Prince of Wales� The firing range was reduced 
to eighteen thousand yards� Within two minutes, Prince of Wales was hit with 
four 15-inch shells and probably three 8-inch shells� Its salvos now were falling 
short and had a very large spread� Hence, Captain John Leach, the commanding 
officer of Prince of Wales, decided to break off the engagement�237 By then the 
range had been reduced to only 14,600 yards�238 At 0613, Prince of Wales turned 
away under a smoke screen�239 The ship had two guns out of action and consider-
able damage to its bridge�240 Yet it had performed well, even though its crew was 
only partly trained�241 Bismarck had received two heavy and one light hits� It left 
a trail of oil from one of its tanks�242
At 0632, Lütjens sent a signal to Naval Group Command North informing it 
that one battle cruiser, probably Hood, had been sunk, while one battleship, either 
King George or Renown, was damaged and had withdrawn� Two enemy heavy 
cruisers maintained contact with Bismarck. In the meantime, B-Dienst decrypted 
a series of messages sent by Suffolk and Norfolk�243
Lütjens’s Fateful Decision. Admiral Lütjens made the decision not to pursue the 
damaged Prince of Wales� Perhaps the main reason was that continuing the en-
gagement would have required sailing at higher speed, resulting in higher fuel 
consumption� This would have had an especially negative effect on Prinz Eugen, 
because of its shorter range� Lütjens also was probably unsure whether he could 
destroy Prince of Wales as quickly as he had Hood� Moreover, his principal mis-
sion was to destroy enemy shipping, not the enemy’s heavy surface ships�244
After sinking Hood, Lütjens could steer to Bergen, Trondheim, or Saint-
Nazaire to attend to the damages he had suffered in the Denmark Strait� The 
route to Bergen ran between the Faeroes and the Shetlands, with a transit dis-
tance of 1,150 nautical miles� This was the shortest route and the fastest way to 
reach an area where the Luftwaffe could provide effective cover� Its major draw-
back was that the Bismarck group would have to sail within the effective range 
of many enemy aircraft and naval bases� The possibility existed that the Home 
Fleet, based at Scapa Flow, might appear� These reasons made this route the most 
dangerous for the Bismarck group to take�
The route to Trondheim ran either south of Iceland (approximately 1,300 nm) or 
through the Denmark Strait (approximately 1,400 nm)�245 The major advantage of 
the route through the Denmark Strait was that the Bismarck group would sail into 
an area of extensive low visibility and close to the ice boundary, making the threat 
from enemy aircraft much smaller than on the other routes� However, the threat 
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of encountering enemy heavy ships could not be excluded entirely� The Bismarck 
group needed to make only seven hundred nautical miles good toward Trondheim 
for the Luftwaffe to protect it effectively� This route also offered the best chance 
of avoiding the main body of the Home Fleet if it made a foray into the Arctic�246
The route to Saint-Nazaire was about 1,700 nautical miles long—making it 
the longest route—and more than two thousand nautical miles if the Bismarck 
group made a temporary swing westward� A major disadvantage of this route was 
that Bismarck would run the risk of encountering a large concentration of enemy 
forces� But the advantage of this route was that the vast expanse of the North At-
lantic might make it possible to shake off the shadowers� Another advantage was 
that reaching Saint-Nazaire would offer Bismarck a much more favorable position 
for conducting war in the Atlantic�247 A major disadvantage of this route was that 
the enemy could use land-based and carrier-based aircraft to detect and attack 
the Bismarck group, then concentrate his heavy surface ships to prevent Bismarck 
from actually reaching Saint-Nazaire�
Lütjens chose to steer for Saint-Nazaire� We only can speculate about his 
reasons� In any case, it is clear that once the element of surprise was lost the best 
option was to cancel the entire operation and return home�248 Some SKL staffers 
and the commanders of Naval Group Command North and Naval Group Com-
mand West argued that Lütjens should have been directed to return home, but 
Raeder believed that such a decision should be left to Lütjens to make�249 A better 
option for Lütjens would have been to pursue Prince of Wales, destroy it, then sail 
for Trondheim via the Denmark Strait�
THE BRITISH OPERATIONAL REACTION
Operational Concentration, May 24‒25
The Admiralty broadcast CS 1 sightings of the Bismarck group on May 24� 
Among other things, it directed Admiral Somerville to sail from Gibraltar with 
Force H to join the convoy that Repulse was to have brought south of the Clyde, 
which now had only the cruiser Exeter as an escort� At the same time, the Ad-
miralty added that “should reconnaissance today (24th) indicate that one or 
both German battle cruisers have left Brest it will be necessary you alter these 
instructions�” The Admiralty also ordered CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and 
Arethusa), which had been patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, to join north-
east of Langanes, Iceland, “in readiness to form a patrol line in event of enemy 
breaking back�” It also arranged for air patrols with the same purpose�250
At 0800, the Battle Force was about three hundred miles away to the southeast-
ward of the Denmark Strait and sailing at twenty-seven knots�251 Tovey believed 
that the enemy, having sunk Hood, was unlikely to turn back� Hence, the best 
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hope was to intercept Bismarck with the Battle Force� Tovey ordered a course 
change to 260, then 240� The most unfavorable situation for the Home Fleet 
would be if the enemy hugged the eastern coast of Greenland, then sailed toward 
Norway’s western coast to take fuel from a waiting tanker� If that happened, Bis-
marck would be able to escape the pursuit by King George V�252 The Admiralty 
directed Rear Admiral William F� Wake-Walker (1888–1945), commander of CS 
1, to “continue to shadow Bismarck even if you run out of fuel, in order that the 
commander in chief [Tovey] may catch up in time�”253
At 0801, Lütjens sent a repeat message to the SKL and both naval group com-
manders about the encounter in the Denmark Strait� He also reported that the 
free fairway in the Denmark Strait was some fifty miles wide and contained 
floating mines�254
After the engagement with Prince of Wales, the Bismarck group sailed on a 
southwesterly course� Bismarck tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to shake off 
the shadowers� Suffolk masterfully used RDF to maintain contact�255
In the meantime, the Admiralty made a series of tactical decisions to direct a 
number of ships in the Atlantic to take part in the pursuit of Bismarck� Collec-
tively these decisions resulted in an operational concentration� Rodney had sailed 
from the Clyde on May 21 en route to Boston for refit, accompanying the troop 
transport Britannia� The Admiralty gave the position of Bismarck and directed 
Rodney to close in, leaving Britannia behind, with one destroyer to screen it�256 
At 1022, Rodney, then some 520 miles west of Bloody Foreland, county Donegal, 
Ireland, was directed to steer best course to close the enemy� Ramillies, which 
was escorting Convoy HX127, was then a thousand miles south of the Bismarck 
group; at 1144, it was ordered to leave the convoy and proceed to contact the en-
emy from the west�257 At 1234, the Admiralty ordered Revenge to sail from Halifax 
and overtake Convoy HX128� The cruisers Edinburgh (then cruising near latitude 
45 degrees N and longitude 21 degrees W) and London (escorting the 19,000-ton 
troopship Arundel Castle from Gibraltar) received orders to “give up their task 
and steer toward the enemy, husbanding fuel against future needs�”258
At 1340, the SKL and both naval group commanders received Lütjens’s mes-
sage sent at 0801 on May 24� This was when they first learned about the outcome 
of the encounter in the Denmark Strait, the extent of damage to Bismarck, and 
Lütjens’s intent to sail for Saint-Nazaire�259
At 1400, the Bismarck group’s position was about 240 nautical miles north-
northeast of Cape Farewell�260 Lütjens sent a signal to the SKL and the naval group 
commanders that the battleship King George was maintaining contact with his 
group� If there were no combat, his intent was to break off from the shadowers 
during the night of May 24/25�261 At 1420, Lütjens directed Prinz Eugen to main-
tain its present course until three hours after Bismarck’s maneuver to the west to 
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BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE, MAY 18, 1941
 (F = flagship)
HOME FLEET
CINC, Home Fleet: Admiral Sir John C. Tovey
2 battleships: King George V (F) (at Scapa Flow), Rodney (en route from the 
Clyde to Boston with Britannia)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (825 Sqdn) (at Scapa Flow, to escort Convoy 
WS8B)
1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON (BCS 1)
Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron: Lancelot E. Holland
2 battle cruisers: Hood (at Scapa Flow), Repulse (at the Clyde, to escort 
Convoy WS8B)
1 battleship: Prince of Wales (at Scapa Flow)
1ST CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 1)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 1: William F. Wake-Walker
2 heavy cruisers: Norfolk (on Denmark Strait patrol), Suffolk (refueling at 
Reykjavík)
2ND CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 2)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 2: Neville Syfret
4 light cruisers: Aurora, Galatea, Kenya, Neptune (at Scapa Flow)
18TH CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 18)
Commodore C. M. Blackman
4 light cruisers: Manchester, Birmingham (on Faeroes–Iceland passage patrol); 
Arethusa (en route to Reykjavík); Edinburgh (on patrol off the 
Azores)
DESTROYERS
Inglefield, Intrepid (en route to Scapa Flow); Achates, Active, Antelope, An-
thony, Echo, Electra, Icarus, Nestor, Punjabi (at Scapa Flow); Jupiter 
(at Londonderry); Eskimo, Mishona, Somali, Tartar (at sea with Rod-
ney and Britannia)
WESTERN APPROACHES COMMAND (Liverpool)
1 light cruiser: Hermione (en route to Scapa Flow to join CS 2)
5 destroyers (escorts for Repulse): Lance (at Scapa Flow); Assiniboine, Legion, 
Saguenay (at the Clyde); Columbia (at Londonderry)
PLYMOUTH COMMAND
4th Destroyer Flotilla: Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Zulu; Piorun (Polish) (at the Clyde, 
as escorts for Convoy WS8B)
NORE COMMAND
1 destroyer: Windsor (at Scapa Flow)
FORCE H (at Gibraltar)
Flag Officer Commanding, Force H: Vice Admiral Sir James F. Somerville
1 battle cruiser: Renown
1 aircraft carrier: Ark Royal (810, 818, 828 Sqdns)
1 light cruiser: Sheffield
5 destroyers: Faulkner, Foresight, Forester, Fury, Hesperus
AMERICA AND WEST INDIES COMMAND
2 battleships: Ramillies (escorting Convoy HX127), Revenge (at Halifax, Nova 
Scotia)
SOUTH ATLANTIC COMMAND
1 heavy cruiser: Dorsetshire (escorting Convoy SL74)
SUBMARINES
Rear Admiral, Submarines: Max K. Horton (Aberdour / north London)
P-31 (at Scapa Flow); Sealion, Seawolf, Sturgeon (in English Channel); Pan-
dora (en route from Gibraltar to United Kingdom); Tigris (at the 
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shake off the shadowers. Prinz Eugen then would refuel from a tanker (Belchen 
or Lothringen)� After receiving the signal “Hood,” it would operate independently 
and conduct commerce raiding�262
At 1440, Dönitz issued an instruction to the U-boats to establish a patrol 
line southeast of Cape Farewell� The aim was to lure enemy ships approaching 
from the north� At that time, Lütjens’s intent was to operate in the area halfway 
between Greenland and Newfoundland� The Bismarck group would carry out a 
swing and lure pursuing enemy forces over the U-boat patrol line� The distance 
of the U-boat patrol line from the British coast was about 1,400 nautical miles�263 
The depth of the patrol line would be ten nautical miles� Dönitz ordered the U-
boats to reach their assigned positions by 0600 on May 25�264
At 1445, the Admiralty requested that Admiral Wake-Walker provide infor-
mation on the percentage of fighting effectiveness Bismarck retained and about 
his intent to have Prince of Wales reengage� In his response at 1545, Admiral 
Wake-Walker stated that he had no evidence that the damage the enemy had 
received had reduced his speed at all� Wake-Walker also believed that the enemy 
would not reengage but would try to avoid any combat�265 Wake-Walker also 
stated that Prince of Wales “should not reengage until the other heavy ships are in 
contact and unless interception fails; doubtful if she has speed to force action�”266 
The reason for not reengaging Bismarck was that the cruisers of CS 1 might be 
damaged and thereby forced to reduce their speed� This would make it impos-
sible to maintain contact with Bismarck. Admiral Tovey believed that, under the 
circumstances, Wake-Walker was justified in his decision� Tovey believed that his 
forces were more likely ultimately to destroy Bismarck if he used the cruisers to 
maintain contact until the approaching reinforcements arrived�267
At 1455, Tovey reported that Victorious, escorted by CS 2 (Galatea, Aurora, 
Kenya, and Hermione), was detached to launch an aerial torpedo attack at about 
2200, when within a hundred-mile range of the enemy�268 The aim was to reduce 
Bismarck’s speed� Tovey believed that keeping Victorious with the Battle Force 
Clyde); H44 (at Rothesay); Minerve (Q185) (French) (off Norway’s 
southwestern coast)
RAF COASTAL COMMAND
No. 15 Group (Liverpool)
No. 16 Group (Chatham, Kent)
No. 18 (Pitreavie Castle, Scotland)
Sources: Training and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, 
London, “Appendix A: Bismarck Operations; List of H.M. Ships, C.B. 3081 (3),” in Battle 
Summary No. 5, pp. 38–40; Schofield, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 72–75; Air Marshal, 
CINC, Coastal Command, “Dispatches of CINC Home Fleet on the Sinking of the Bis-
marck,” September 3, 1946, app. A, AIR 15/204, TNA; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship 
Bismarck (1980), pp. 264–67; Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 
pp. 63–64.
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until the morning of the next day (May 25) would not be helpful in locating Bis-
marck if it had slipped away during the three hours of darkness� The remainder 
of the Battle Force (King George V and Repulse) and its escorts steered an inter-
cepting course� The aim was to bring the enemy to action soon after sunrise�269
At 1800, Tovey was with King George V, Repulse, Victorious, and two cruis-
ers�270 CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and Arethusa) was returning from a point 
northeast of Iceland to Hvalfjord to refuel� The battleship Revenge left Halifax at 
1505 to overtake Convoys HX128 and SC32� Admiral Somerville, with his Force 
H (Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and a half dozen destroyers), was directed to 
join Convoy WS8B after daylight on May 26�271
In the meantime, the shadowers shortened the distance to Bismarck. At 1830, 
Bismarck opened fire on Suffolk� Prince of Wales fired several salvos at Bismarck 
from thirty thousand yards� However, this brief encounter did not result in dam-
age to any of the ships�272
At 1842, Naval Group Command West sent a radio message in which it agreed 
with Lütjens’s intent to release Prinz Eugen to operate independently� It informed 
Lütjens that preparations were under way at Saint-Nazaire and Brest to receive 
Bismarck� It also suggested that if Bismarck successfully broke away from its 
shadowers it should remain in its present isolated area�273 However, Bismarck’s 
reduced speed made breaking off contact more difficult� Neither Raeder nor the 
two naval group commanders knew whether Lütjens had considered the pos-
sibility of avoiding the enemy by moving northward, or which factors he had 
considered when he selected Saint-Nazaire�274
At 2210, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers took off from Victorious; at 2300, 
they were followed by three Fulmar fighters; at 2400, two more Fulmars took off� 
The weather was showery with squalls, good visibility, and a northwesterly wind� 
Sunset was at 0052�275 At about midnight on May 24/25, twelve aircraft (seven 
Swordfish and five Fulmars) from Victorious carried out a torpedo attack on Bis-
marck; however, they claimed just one hit on the ship� This first air attack failed 
to inflict any serious damage on Bismarck.276
In the meantime, at 2331, the Admiralty sent new orders to Force H “to steer 
so as to intercept Bismarck from the southward� Enemy must be short on fuel, and 
will have to make for an oiler; her future movements may guide to this oiler�”277
Loss of Contact with Bismarck, 0213 May 25
CS 1 lost contact with Bismarck at 0213 (Prince of Wales claimed this happened 
at 0126) on May 25�278 Heretofore, despite frequent and abrupt changes in the 
visibility, Norfolk and Suffolk had maintained contact with Bismarck skillfully for 
thirty hours�279 When Tovey received the information that contact with Bismarck 
was lost, he believed that the German battleship had three options: rendezvous 
with a tanker, possibly off the east coast of Greenland or farther south, such as 
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near the Azores or Canary Islands; make for a dockyard on the west coast of 
France, or possibly an Italian port in the Mediterranean; or return to Germany 
for repairs�280
At 0300, Force H was approximately 850 miles west of Porto, Portugal� Heavy 
seas had delayed its progress�281 CS 2, with Victorious and four accompanying 
cruisers, was directed to organize a search northwest of Bismarck’s last known po-
sition� Norfolk and Suffolk, after remaining at the enemy’s last known position for 
some time, proceeded westward to cover the southwestern sector� Rodney, with 
three destroyers, reported that it was steering to intercept the enemy if it showed 
up in the southeastern sector� Repulse had yet to be detached to Newfoundland 
to refuel, while Prince of Wales was directed at 0620 to join Tovey’s Battle Force� 
The Admiralty directed London to search the area around latitude 25° 30ʹ N, lon-
gitude 42° W, where an enemy tanker was believed to be located�282
At 0800 on May 25, Bismarck was some one hundred miles astern of King 
George V, sailing southeast�283 At 0854, Lütjens sent a message in which he erro-
neously stated that the enemy ships still were shadowing Bismarck. The sending 
of this signal gave away his position to the British radio-intercept operators� At 
1030, Tovey received from the Admiralty a series of DF fixes� They indicated that 
the signals appeared to come from the same ship that had transmitted several 
signals soon after the torpedo attack by aircraft from Victorious the previous 
night (i�e�, Bismarck)� When these fixes were plotted incorrectly on King George 
V, they showed a position too far north� This provided a misleading indicator 
that the enemy was retreating northward toward the North Sea� This informa-
tion confirmed Tovey’s existing belief that Bismarck was heading north�284 This 
is why Tovey directed the entire Home Fleet to search to the north� King George 
V changed course to 055, increased speed to twenty-seven knots, and headed 
toward the Iceland–Faeroes passage�285 But Tovey’s decision was unsound�
The Admiralty, for its part, apparently was not entirely convinced that Bis-
marck was sailing northward� So at 1023 the Admiralty directed Admiral Somer-
ville and CS 1 to proceed “on assumption that enemy turned towards Brest�”286 
In another signal sent at 1100, the Admiralty signaled to Somerville to “act as 
though the enemy is proceeding to a Bay of Biscay port�” The Admiralty had great 
difficulty obtaining accurate information about the position of Bismarck. A DF 
fix at 1320 located Bismarck at a position within fifty miles of 55° 15ʹ N, 32° W� 
The Admiralty transmitted this information to Tovey at 1419, and he received 
it at 1530� At 1428, the Admiralty directed Rodney to ignore the signal sent at 
1108, which had directed the battleship to proceed in the direction of Brest, and 
to comply with Tovey’s instructions that assumed Bismarck was proceeding to 
Norway via the Iceland–Scotland passage� At 1621, Tovey sent a query to the 
Admiralty: “Do you consider that enemy is making for Faroes�”287 
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However, by the late afternoon and early evening of May 25 the Admiralty’s 
view about Bismarck’s movements had changed in favor of the Bay of Biscay 
destination� At 1805, the Admiralty canceled the signal it had sent to Rodney at 
1428 and directed the ship to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceed-
ing toward a French port� Finally, at 1924, the Admiralty informed Tovey and all 
other forces that it believed Bismarck was heading toward a French port� Tovey 
already had come to the same conclusion at 1810, when he decided to turn his 
force onto a southeasterly course, heading toward the Bay of Biscay�288
Final confirmation came in the evening and from an unlikely source� General 
Hans Jeschonnek (1899‒1943), the Luftwaffe chief of staff, sent a message to the 
Naval High Command asking whether Bismarck would be coming into a French 
port for repairs� (The reason for this might have been personal: Jeschonnek’s son 
served in Bismarck.) This message was sent in the Luftwaffe’s Enigma code, and 
hence was readable to the British decoders� Jeschonnek’s message was deciphered 
quickly and passed on to the Admiralty, and at 1812 was sent to Tovey as well� 
Tovey’s error had given Bismarck a chance to escape�289
In the meantime, at 1320 on May 25, Raeder briefed Hitler on Bismarck’s 
situation� He reported that during the night of May 24/25 the enemy had main-
tained contact with Bismarck. Because the enemy used advanced radar, Bismarck 
had not been able to break off contact� Near Bismarck were one battleship (King 
George V), two heavy cruisers, and one carrier� Lütjens reported around midnight 
on May 24 that Prinz Eugen had been detached for refueling in the mid-Atlantic� 
This maneuver went unobserved by the enemy� Lütjens intended to reach Saint-
Nazaire� All available U-boats and light naval forces would be used to support 
Bismarck�290 
At 1932, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens about pending 
actions in support of Bismarck. Air units would be used during the approach 
phase to a French port� Luftwaffe aircraft would conduct reconnaissance out to 
longitude 15 degrees W� Bombers would be used out to longitude 14 degrees W� 
Long-range reconnaissance would be conducted out to longitude 25 degrees W� 
By 1313 on May 25, six U-boats had deployed to their assigned positions (see 
map 1)� The approaches to Brest and Saint-Nazaire would be strongly controlled� 
There also was a possibility that Bismarck could return to the port of La Pallice�291 
In the evening on May 25, Tovey still had Repulse in company with King 
George V� Rodney was sailing on a southeasterly course toward the Bay of Biscay� 
The Admiralty recalled Ramillies to rejoin Britannia and sail to Boston� At 2100, 
CS 1 was at latitude 55° 50ʹ N, longitude 31° 28ʹ W� It sailed on a southeasterly 
course (120) at twenty-six knots� It was some one hundred miles behind Tovey’s 
Battle Force� However, it was low on fuel, with only fifty percent remaining� The 
cruiser London proceeded to search for an enemy tanker halfway between the 
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Azores and the Leeward Islands� On the morning of May 26, the cruiser Edin-
burgh’s fuel was at only 13 percent of capacity� That evening, Prince of Wales was 
directed to sail to Iceland for refueling�292
At 0053 on May 26, Naval Group Command West reported that four FW-200s 
would provide loose coverage between latitudes 43° 30ʹ N and 54° 25ʹ N and out 
to longitude 25 degrees W� With additional aircraft they would provide heavier 
coverage out to longitude 19 degrees W in the northern part and to longitude 14 
degrees W in the southern part� Despite bad weather, the four FW-200s covered 
their assignment� Because of the stormy weather it was not possible to send Ger-
man destroyers to the area to relieve the enemy pressure on Bismarck.293 
Bismarck’s situation worsened on May 26� That morning Bismarck was some 
seven hundred nautical miles away from the French coast� Some thirty-one 
hours had passed since the British cruisers had lost contact with Bismarck, but 
now three British forces were converging on Bismarck, plus several single large 
surface combatants� The 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Cossack, Sikh, Zulu, Maori, and 
Piorun) was detached from Convoy WS8B� The ships were directed to join and 
screen King George V and Rodney� One destroyer (Jupiter) at Londonderry was 
directed to join the same screen� After receiving the first enemy report on the 
morning of May 26, the cruiser Dorsetshire left Convoy SL74 and proceeded to 
join the Battle Force�294
In the meantime, other British forces that were unable to reach Bismarck’s 
most probable track moved to cover its alternative possible movements� Two light 
cruisers (Manchester and Birmingham) of CS 18 patrolled within the Iceland–
Faeroes passage, while another light cruiser of the same squadron (Arethusa) 
patrolled the Denmark Strait� Victorious and CS 2 were positioned to prevent 
the enemy from gaining access to the Iceland–Faeroes passage� If necessary, 
CS 2 would be detached to fuel at Hvalfjord� Prince of Wales was on the way to 
Hvalfjord and destroyers were directed to screen both Prince of Wales and CS 2�295 
Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic was instructed to arrange air and 
submarine patrols to prevent passage of the Strait of Gibraltar� The battleship 
Nelson was recalled from Freetown to Gibraltar to reinforce the forces converg-
ing on Bismarck. The cruiser London was recalled from its search for the enemy 
tanker between the Azores and the Leewards and was directed to escort Convoy 
SL75, which was approaching the Bay of Biscay� Suffolk was sent to search in 
the Davis Strait (between Greenland and Canada’s Baffin Island) for the enemy 
supply ships and tankers believed to be in the area and from which Prinz Eugen 
might refuel�296 
The Admiralty’s arrangement on May 25 provided for RAF commands to 
cooperate by conducting reconnaissance from Iceland and the Faeroes to and 
including the coast of Norway� Canadian aircraft conducted six-hundred-mile 
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searches from Newfoundland� One of the American air squadrons based in New-
foundland also took part in the searches�297 Coastal Command established two 
patrols across Bismarck’s probable track, from latitude 52° 19ʹ 30˝ N to 48 degrees 
N, out to longitude 23° 30ʹ W�298 
Contact with Bismarck Restored
Finally, at 1030 on May 26, Bismarck was detected some six hundred nautical 
miles west of Land’s End, by a Catalina seaplane of Coastal Command based at 
Plymouth�299 However, the Catalina lost contact because of antiaircraft (AA) fire 
from Bismarck.300 Ark Royal launched two long-range aircraft to search for Bis-
marck.301 At 1114, an aircraft from Ark Royal reestablished contact with Bismarck. 
Bismarck’s position was latitude 49° 20ʹ N, longitude 20° 50ʹ W, or forty miles 
from the position the Catalina had reported some forty-five minutes earlier�302 
After this point, Bismarck was kept under almost continuous surveillance for 
the rest of the day�303 Visibility in the area was variable, the wind northwesterly 
at force 7–8�304 Bismarck steered a southeasterly course at twenty-two knots� The 
distance between Bismarck and Tovey’s Battle Force was too great to close unless 
Bismarck’s speed could be reduced� This could be accomplished only by a torpedo 
attack by Ark Royal’s aircraft� At 1052, the Admiralty directed Admiral Somer-
ville not to have Renown engage unless Bismarck already was engaged heavily 
with King George V or Rodney�305 
A major and increasingly critical problem for the Home Fleet was the fuel 
situation, especially regarding the battleships� King George V had only 1,200 tons 
of fuel remaining, or 38 percent� Rodney had to part company at 0800 on May 
27� When these ships joined the Battle Force, they had to share the A/S screen 
provided by only three destroyers (Somali, Tartar, and Mishona)—and those de-
stroyers had to leave that night for lack of fuel� The British suspected that there 
were several U-boats in the area� They also assumed that every available enemy 
destroyer and U-boat in western France would be ordered to sail out as well� The 
Admiralty warned Tovey to expect heavy air attacks�306 
Tovey considered it essential to have fuel reserves sufficient to allow battle-
ships to return to their home bases� After the loss of Hood and the damage in-
flicted on Prince of Wales, King George V was the only effective battleship in home 
waters� Tovey was not willing to expose King George V unscreened and sailing at 
low speed to almost certain attack by U-boats unless there was a good chance to 
achieve results that were commensurate with the risk� Tovey’s decision was that 
unless Bismarck’s speed was reduced, King George V would leave the pursuit at 
2400 on May 26 and proceed to refuel�307
At 1115, Bismarck reported its position some six hundred nautical miles west 
of Brest� In the afternoon Lütjens was directed that if the bad weather in the Bay 
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of Biscay prevented him from proceeding to Saint-Nazaire he should steer toward 
Brest� Reichsmarschal Göring directed the Luftwaffe to make all efforts with the 
aircraft available to support Bismarck’s return.308
At 1315, Somerville detached the cruiser Sheffield�309 The Admiralty also 
directed Somerville not to engage Bismarck until other battleships arrived in 
the vicinity; Force H’s Renown was no match for Bismarck�310 In the afternoon, 
Sheffield obtained contact with Bismarck� The first aerial striking force from Ark 
Royal flew at about 1450�311 Sheffield vectored the attack in.312 The aircraft reached 
Bismarck at about 1550 and carried out their torpedo attack�313 However, all the 
torpedoes missed their target�314 
At 1630, an aircraft from Ark Royal reported Bismarck’s position at latitude 
47° 40ʹ N, longitude 18° 15ʹ W� Bismarck was steering a southeasterly course 
(120) at twenty-two knots� Somerville directed Sheffield to maintain contact with 
Bismarck, while he kept Ark Royal and Renown outside the effective range of 
Bismarck’s heavy guns�315 
In one message from Lütjens, the SKL learned that Bismarck’s loss of fuel from 
its ongoing leak was more serious than hitherto believed� Naval Group Com-
mand West considered sending one supply ship (Ermland) during the night of 
May 26/27 to refuel Bismarck�316 By the evening the situation was considered very 
serious, but the SKL expected that Bismarck would be able to defend itself against 
torpedo attacks and in the early morning would be within the effective range of 
Luftwaffe aircraft�317
Six U-boats were concentrated not far away from Bismarck; four had torpe-
does, while two were without� At 1900, one U-boat (U-48) was directed to sail at 
highest speed toward Sheffield, yet it never established contact�318 At 2000, one 
U-boat (U-556) obtained contact with a battleship of the King George class, and 
the carrier Ark Royal passed within effective range, but the U-boat had no torpe-
does, and it lost contact�319
At 1910, fifteen Swordfish aircraft flew off from Ark Royal�320 Sheffield directed 
them to Bismarck�321 Weather conditions were bad: skies 7/10 covered by low 
rain clouds; winds force 6; seas rolling, with a northwesterly swell; and daylight 
fading�322 The first wave of aircraft attacked at 2053�323 The British attack was 
not synchronized, spreading over thirty-eight minutes, and only two of thirteen 
torpedoes fired scored a hit� One torpedo hit the armor belt and had little effect� 
But the second torpedo sealed Bismarck’s fate: it damaged the ship’s propellers, 
wrecked its steering gear, and jammed its rudders�324 This severely affected Bis-
marck’s ability to maneuver, and therefore to continue sailing toward a French 
port�325 The German AA fire was intense and accurate; Bismarck’s AA guns shot 
down seven British aircraft�326
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The Germans intercepted many of the British radio messages to the destroy-
ers and Force H�327 Observation and radio intercepts indicated that Bismarck was 
surrounded by at least three, possibly four, battleships; the carrier Ark Royal; two 
heavy cruisers; one light cruiser, and possibly a second; and the 4th Destroyer 
Flotilla, with many modern destroyers�328 This spelled a situation that was hope-
less for Bismarck� It was also tragic, because, except for being unable to maneuver, 
the ship retained its full striking power�329 At that time, Bismarck was only four 
hundred nautical miles from Brest, but enemy forces in the vicinity made it im-
possible to bring tankers to refuel�330 Very bad weather prevented the Germans 
from using their destroyers or bringing out tugs to take Bismarck in tow� Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau were undergoing repairs� Bismarck’s only support would 
come from the Luftwaffe and the U-boats operating in the Bay of Biscay�331 
Admiral Tovey decided to detach from the Battle Force all five destroyers of 
the 4th Destroyer Flotilla� They were directed to shadow and attack Bismarck. 
Their reports to Tovey throughout the night were invaluable� Tovey requested 
that Force H, with Ark Royal and Renown, withdraw southward to clear the way 
for his battleships to close with Bismarck in the morning� The heavy cruiser Nor-
folk also arrived in the area�332
At about midnight, Lütjens sent a message to Naval Group Command West: 
“Ship is able to defend itself and propulsion plant intact� Does not respond to 
steering with engines, however�”333 The weather conditions were unfavorable� The 
horizon was clear from northwest to northeast, but other sectors experienced 
rainstorms and poor visibility� Bismarck made frequent changes of course be-
tween southwest and northeast� Its speed was only ten to twelve knots�334 Between 
0122 and 0146 on May 27, three British destroyers (Cossack, Zulu, and Maori) 
carried out torpedo attacks on Bismarck� Each destroyer achieved one hit�335 Bis-
marck’s speed was reduced to only eight knots and its movements became even 
more erratic� Yet Bismarck still was able to deliver heavy and accurate fire�336
At 2400, Lütjens sent a message to Hitler: “We fight to the last in our belief 
in you, my Führer, and in unshakable confidence in Germany’s victory�” At the 
same time he also sent a message to Naval High Command and Naval Group 
Command West: “Unable to maneuver� We fight until the last grenade� Long live 
the Führer�” At 0153, Hitler sent a message to Lütjens: “Thank you in the name of 
the entire German people�” He also addressed Bismarck’s crew: “All of Germany 
is with you� What can still be done will be done�”337 
At 0542, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that two FW-200s 
had taken off at 0330 to conduct reconnaissance from 0445 to 0515, with an-
other three bomber groups taking off at 0530�338 This was despite the fact that 
the weather was highly unfavorable for air operations�339 Some German aircraft 
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established contact with enemy cruisers and destroyers, but their effect on the 
Bismarck situation was negligible�340 
At 0835, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that at about 1100 on 
May 27, the Spanish cruiser Canarias and two destroyers would leave El Ferrol 
en route to Bismarck’s position, to be available to render assistance� They would 
proceed at twenty to twenty-two knots�341 
The End
In the morning on May 27, weather conditions were winds northwesterly at force 
8, skies overcast, rainsqualls, and visibility of thirteen miles or so� Sunrise was at 
0702�342 Bismarck sailed on course 330 at ten knots (see map 2)� At 0755, Tovey’s 
force had the enemy on bearing 120 at twenty-one miles� Tovey directed a course 
change to the east (080) to close with Bismarck�343 At 0900, King George V and 
Rodney turned to a southerly course (170) and opened fire with their main guns� 
By 0930, Bismarck was on fire and virtually out of control; however, its speed was 
not reduced, and its main guns still were firing� It also used its secondary arma-
ment�344 At 0954, Norfolk joined the action� All three ships fired independently at 
ranges as short as 3,300 yards� By 1000, Bismarck’s main guns were out of action, 
and ten minutes later the secondary guns stopped firing� Bismarck was now a 
wreck, on fire fore and aft and wallowing heavily�345 Tovey ordered a stop to the 
action, and all firing ceased at 1022� The cruiser Dorsetshire (which had left Con-
voy SL74) had just arrived at the scene of the action�346 Tovey ordered Dorsetshire 
to close in to finish off Bismarck by torpedoing� So perhaps it was Dorsetshire’s 
torpedoes that sank Bismarck, although German sources maintain that the ship 
was sunk by activating scuttling charges�347 Bismarck sank at 1037, at latitude 48° 
10ʹ N, longitude 16° 12ʹ W� Its colors still flew�348
Out of 2,200 men aboard the ship, only 115 were saved�349 The cruiser Dorset-
shire took aboard eighty-five survivors and the destroyer Maori twenty-five� Then 
the British ships stopped their efforts because of their concern that U-boats were 
in the vicinity� U-74 saved three men and one weather steamer (Sachsenwald) 
picked up two men on May 28�350
Bismarck showed a remarkable resilience� Out of seventy-one torpedoes fired, 
at least eight, if not twelve, hit the ship�351 The number of hits by 16-inch shells 
is unknown, but must have been very large� World War I had demonstrated the 
Germans’ ability to build tremendously stout ships, and apparently they had not 
lost it during the interwar years�352
Withdrawal of the Home Fleet
The ships of the Home Fleet returned to their bases in northern Scotland� King 
George V and Rodney, with three destroyers (Cossack, Sikh, and Zulu), proceeded 
northward� Dorsetshire and Maori rejoined them at 1230 on May 27, and nine 
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other destroyers rejoined at 1600 on May 28� They received several signals warn-
ing of heavy enemy attacks on that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared� 
However, at 1200 on the 28th, one hundred miles to the south, destroyers Misho-
na and Tartar suffered heavy attacks, and Mishona was sunk� Rodney, screened by 
Maori, and Columbia were detached to the Clyde at 1700 on May 28� Dorsetshire 
was detached to the Tyne at 2316� Fog delayed the battleships, but they entered 
Loch Ewe eventually, at 1230 on May 29�353
In his after-action report, Tovey wrote: “She [Bismarck] had put up a most 
gallant fight against impossible odds, worthy of the old days of the Imperial 
German Navy�” He opined that it was unfortunate that “for political reasons” 
this fact could not be made public�354 Tovey praised the cooperation, skill, and 
understanding that all forces had displayed during the prolonged chase of Bis-
marck; flag officers and commanding officers invariably acted as “I would have 
wished before and without receiving instructions from me�”355 The Admiralty 
exercised excellent strategic control� The coordination of the movements and 
actions of the many disparate forces across a large part of the northern Atlantic 
was superb� Admiral Tovey wrote that “the accuracy of information supplied by 
the Admiralty and the speed with which it was passed were remarkable, and the 
balance struck between information and instructions passed to the forces out of 
visual touch with me was ideal�”356
The failure of RHEINÜBUNG and the sinking of Bismarck had a major effect 
on the future employment of German heavy surface combatants against British 
and Allied shipping in the North Atlantic� Admiral Raeder wrote later that prior 
to May 27, 1941, he had considerable freedom of action in determining the em-
ployment of heavy surface ships, as long as there were no negative effects on the 
actions of other services of the Wehrmacht� But because of the loss of Bismarck, 
Hitler in his subsequent instructions greatly limited that freedom� Among other 
things, he prohibited the sending of heavy ships to conduct commerce warfare 
in the Atlantic, and the Kriegsmarine attempted no such operations for the re-
mainder of the war�357
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The main reasons for the failure of RHEINÜBUNG were as follows: the German 
surface ships’ base of operations was extremely unfavorable in multiple ways; the 
plan was overly reliant on the ships breaking out into the North Atlantic unde-
tected; and—perhaps most important—air reconnaissance was inadequate, and 
the ships were operating beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft�
The deployment and combat employment of the forces opposing RHEIN­
ÜBUNG took place over the vast space of the North Atlantic� The harsh weather 
conditions significantly affected the employment of surface ships and aircraft 
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and the effectiveness of their weapons and sensors� Bad weather in the Denmark 
Strait favored the Germans because it greatly enhanced the chances of an unde-
tected breakout into the North Atlantic�
The German surface ships and aircraft operated from a very long and frag-
mented base of operations� Gaining access from the Arctic to the open waters 
of the North Atlantic was extremely difficult� The British not only controlled 
Iceland and all three passages to the Atlantic but also kept under surveillance the 
southern part of the Arctic and southern Norway� Any German attempt to break 
out to the North Atlantic was inherently a high-risk endeavor� Although the 
Germans were well aware that British monitoring of the northern passages had 
improved steadily over the course of 1941, they apparently were overconfident 
in their ability to use bad weather to make an unobserved breakout through the 
Denmark Strait�
Success in a war at sea is difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve without 
favorable positions for basing one’s naval forces and aircraft. Disadvantages of 
geography can be reduced but not eliminated by having highly capable ships and 
aircraft. One of the key responsibilities of operational commanders and their staffs 
is to evaluate realistically all aspects of the operating areas. In planning a major 
naval/joint operation, it is critical to maximize the advantages and minimize the 
disadvantages of one’s base of operations.
Both the Kriegsmarine and the Royal Navy were highly centralized organiza-
tions� Admiral Raeder was generally reluctant to allow full freedom of action 
to subordinate operational commanders� The operational, and in many cases 
the tactical, organization of the Kriegsmarine underwent frequent—and some-
times unnecessary—changes� The establishment of naval group commands did 
not simplify but instead considerably complicated the C2 of German seagoing 
forces� Naval group commands should not have been entrusted with operational 
command of fleet forces� Raeder made an unsound organizational decision by 
directing Lütjens, a four-star admiral, to command a single combat group at sea; 
by doing so, Lütjens became subordinate in some matters to a junior admiral 
(Saalwächter, the commander of Naval Group Command West)� Perhaps such a 
decision would have been appropriate if the entire operation had been carried out 
using four battleships, as originally envisaged� The Kriegsmarine failed to move 
the fleet headquarters ashore� If that had been done, the fleet commander would 
have been a supported commander, while the naval groups’ commanders would 
have been supporting commanders�
In the Royal Navy, the Admiralty exercised strategic, and in some cases opera-
tional, control over all seagoing forces and shore commands� It also often usurped 
the responsibilities of subordinate commanders by making purely tactical deci-
sions� The Home Fleet was the largest and most important seagoing force in 
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home waters� Like the Kriegsmarine’s Fleet Command, the Home Fleet consisted 
of several type commands� Each of these was responsible for both administra-
tion and operations� In combat, it is far more flexible and effective to organize 
diverse forces into task forces/groups subordinate directly to the respective fleet 
commanders� Type commanders should be responsible solely for combat training 
and administration�
A major factor in the successful outcome of a major naval/joint operation is 
sound operational command organization. Optimally, unity of effort should be 
based on unity of command. A single operational commander should have full au-
thority over and responsibility for subordinate tactical forces. Such authority should 
not be shared among two or more commanders. Prior to the planning process, 
higher authority should designate a single supported commander. All other com-
manders should support the supported operational commander fully�
Both British and German operational and tactical intelligence relied pri-
marily on information obtained via air reconnaissance� Especially useful was 
photoreconnaissance� At this time the British ability to penetrate and read the 
German Enigma messages was not as effective as it would be later in the war� In 
contrast, the German B-Dienst seems to have been highly effective in decrypting 
British radio messages� One of the German advantages was that B-Dienst teams 
embarked in major surface combatants, and they usually were very quick in de-
crypting enemy messages� The major advantage the British enjoyed over the Ger-
mans was their establishment of a highly effective network of agents in Norway 
and other Scandinavian countries; perhaps the most effective of these was the Brit-
ish naval attaché in Stockholm and his helpers within the Swedish secret service�
Operational intelligence is one of the key elements for preparing sound plans for 
a major naval/joint operation. It combines strategic and tactical intelligence. Op-
erational intelligence should be based on information collected from diverse sources. 
Human intelligence is a critical and irreplaceable source for obtaining an accurate, 
timely, and relevant operational picture of the situation.
German naval operational planning was methodical and thorough� Nor-
mally, plans for a major operation were based on a relatively large number of 
staff studies and critical comments on these studies by the SKL and naval group 
commanders� The SKL and naval group commanders usually would issue broad 
instructions, while tactical commanders would draft operations orders for sub-
ordinate commanders� The SKL’s objective was to employ the Kriegsmarine’s 
heavy surface forces and auxiliary cruisers to complement the U-boats in their 
war on the British transatlantic convoys� Raeder’s intent was to weaken British 
naval strength in either home waters or the Mediterranean, and either to increase 
convoy defenses or to reduce the number of convoys�
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For the Germans, an almost insurmountable problem was their numerical in-
feriority in surface forces and a lack of adequate and reliable air support� Hence, 
the loss of any major surface combatant such as a battleship would have a much 
greater negative effect than such a loss would have on the Royal Navy� For all the 
high quality of its staff studies and the solid planning it conducted, the SKL made 
some very unrealistic assumptions about the effect that employment of battle-
ships would have on the naval situation in the North Atlantic� Perhaps the single 
most important reason they were unrealistic was geography� Even if the Germans 
incrementally had achieved sea control in the North Atlantic, they were not in a 
position to maintain that control for any length of time; both the Kriegsmarine 
and the Luftwaffe lacked sufficient strength and favorable bases of operations to 
control such a vast area of ocean�
Sea control cannot be achieved by focusing on destroying the enemy forces de-
fending convoys. Doing so invariably will result in a protracted war of attrition. Sea 
control is accomplished primarily by destroying a major part of the enemy forces in 
a major naval/joint operation in the initial phase of the war at sea. The obtaining 
of sea control aims at accomplishing an operational or strategic objective; however, 
consolidating one’s operational/strategic success by maintaining sea control also is 
critical—otherwise the fruits of victory will be lost.
There is no doubt that the decision Raeder faced—whether to employ the 
Bismarck combat group by itself in a new major operation against enemy con-
voys in the Atlantic—was a difficult one� The original intent—employing four 
battleships—probably had a much greater chance of success� Another good 
option would have been to delay the operation until Tirpitz, at least, was fully 
operational� The employment of both Bismarck and Tirpitz jointly would have 
compounded greatly the British problem in terms of preventing their breakouts 
and their subsequent attacks on the transatlantic convoys� In using the Bismarck 
group alone, Raeder took a high—and imprudent—risk� Everything depended 
on the Bismarck group breaking out undetected; otherwise, it was reasonable to 
expect (and not just in retrospect) that the British would make an all-out effort 
to destroy the Bismarck group� Even if Bismarck successfully avoided detection 
and subsequently attacked the convoys, it was almost certain the British would 
do everything possible to prevent its return either through the Denmark Strait 
or into a French port in the Bay of Biscay� Raeder’s concept of employing heavy 
cruisers and auxiliary cruisers to attack enemy ocean shipping was essentially 
sound; however, battleships—especially those of the Bismarck class—were an-
other matter� The risk involved in employing such major surface combatants 
beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft was simply too great, and hence 
unacceptable� The Germans were well aware of the air threat to their surface 
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ships, yet apparently their faith in their ability to break them out into the North 
Atlantic undetected was too strong�
The operational deployment of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Kors-
fjord, Bergen, proceeded uneventfully� But after the Admiralty and Home Fleet 
received information from the naval attaché in Stockholm about the passage of 
the Bismarck group through the Great Belt, they acted quickly� The cruise patrol 
in the Denmark Strait was strengthened� A part of the Home Fleet then in Scapa 
Flow was put into a state of increased combat readiness� Air reconnaissance of 
the Norwegian ports and Arctic waters was intensified� Admiral Tovey properly 
evaluated the situation and made sound decisions for the subsequent disposition 
of his forces� Prior to the encounter in the Denmark Strait, Tovey’s dispositions 
of the Battle Force and cruiser patrols covered all three northern passages, while 
keeping his Battle Force centrally positioned and able to intervene in a timely 
fashion toward the west or east�
The Germans suspected that British agents had sighted the movement of the 
Bismarck group, but Admiral Lütjens made no major changes to his plans despite 
his suspicions� Perhaps the chances of a successful breakout into the North At-
lantic would have been greater if the Bismarck group had sailed to Trondheim 
instead of Korsfjord, and had remained there for several weeks� This would have 
kept the British in suspense about the direction and timing of the group’s next 
movement�
Tactically, Lütjens handled the Bismarck group much better than his counter-
part, Admiral Holland, handled his forces� The gunnery of both Bismarck and 
Prinz Eugen was superior to that of the British ships� Holland made a mistake in 
detaching his destroyers prior to the encounter, thereby missing the opportunity 
to use them for a torpedo attack on the Bismarck group� Lütjens made a sound 
tactical decision in not pursuing the damaged Prince of Wales; his main mission 
was to attack enemy convoys, not to engage enemy heavy surface ships� Bismarck 
had suffered damages in the encounter with Prince of Wales and their extent was 
not precisely known at the time he had to make his decision� Reengaging Prince 
of Wales might well have resulted in additional damage to Bismarck.
Why Admiral Lütjens decided on the morning of May 24 to steer for Saint-
Nazaire instead of turning north and heading for Trondheim or Bergen is not 
known� He probably had good reason to believe that it would be possible to break 
away from his pursuers and make a westward swing into the open spaces of the 
North Atlantic� Yet he was well aware that once his group was discovered the 
British would make an all-out effort to destroy it� He also was much concerned 
with the threat that enemy carrier-borne torpedo planes posed� At the same time, 
the Bismarck group would operate well beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe 
bombers� In retrospect, it seems that after the encounter with BCS 1 the sound 
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decision would have been to withdraw back through the Denmark Strait� If 
Lütjens had made the decision to do so quickly, he would have had a very good 
chance of not encountering enemy heavy forces on his way to Trondheim or Ber-
gen� In addition, the Bismarck group would have reached the protective cover of 
Luftwaffe aircraft much sooner than on the route to Saint-Nazaire�
The British cruisers’ masterful use of their search radars made it impossible for 
the Germans to shake off their pursuers� This was a major reason the Admiralty 
and Admiral Tovey eventually were able to concentrate an overwhelming force 
against Bismarck� The Admiralty took a high but prudent risk in detaching so 
many ships from convoy duty to take part in the pursuit� In the final phase of the 
operation, Bismarck’s chances diminished steadily� Perhaps if Bismarck had not 
unluckily received the torpedo hit that disabled its rudder there would have been 
some chance for the ship to reach the safety of a French port� Whether that would 
have allowed Bismarck to survive is a question no one can answer for certain�
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